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THE MATERIALS OF LAW STUDY
BRAINERD CURRIE *

PART THREE t
NONLEGAL MATERIALS IN THE LAW SCHOOL:
BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN INTEGRATION
MOVEIENT

I

T

HE MOST sighificant development in American legal, education since
1870 is the movement toward reorganization of courses along func-

tional lines and toward the broadening of law school 9tudies t6 include
nonlegal materials, chiefly from the social sciences, which are relevant

to legal problems. This movement may be regarded as having had its
origin in the extensive studies of legal education undertaken by the faculty of the Law School of Columbia University in 1926-27 and 1927-28.1
* Professor of Law, the University of Chicago Law School.
t Parts One (Introduction)and Two (The Relation between General Education and
the Study of Law: Historical Background) were published in 3 J.LEGAL EDUC.
331 (1951). Like the first two parts, this has been submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of the Science of Law, in the Faculty
of Law, Columbia University.
I See Part One of this study, 3 J.LEGAL EDuc. 331, 332 et seq. (1951), where the
basis for and the limitations of this view are developed. Under the leadership
of Professor Leon C. Marshall, of the University of Chicago School of Business,
the Columbia faculty met for "extended weekly sessions" during the second half
of the academic year 1926-27 and "for a number of such sessions" in 1927-28.
The record of these studies is in two forms: (1) Some seventy-five mimeographed
reports and other documents, totaling about 1100 pages, and known as tie Memoranda of the Marshall Conferences. A set is in the library of the Law School
at Columbia. The author is deeply indebted to Professor Robert L. Hale, who,
in order to facilitate this study, made available a collection of the documents which
he had personally preserved and, to some extent, annotated. This collection was
assembled and bound, together with copies of certain missing documents, by Mr.
Louis Piacenza, of the Law Library of the University of California, Los Angeles,
and is deposited in that library. Wherever possible, citations to these materials
will be by document number, to facilitate reference to either collection; when page
numbers must be referred to, the pagination will be that of the U.C.L.A. collection;
(2) a printed summary of the memoranda (SummrAnx or STru
s nv IMe
EDUCA8 Journal of Legal Ed.No.l-i
1
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The general purpose of this study is to interpret and clarify the objectives of the movement, to appraise its current practical significance, and
to estimate the prospects for its further development. The immediate
purpose of the present portion of the study is to examine in detail the
reasoning which gave the movement impetus at Columbia and the steps
which were taken to put the new program into operation.
If the movement had its origin in the Columbia studies, those studies,
in turn, had origins of their own. The latter were of two kinds: (1)
ideas about law-chiefly, the ideas of sociological and realist jurisprudence; and (2) specific curricular problems growing out of experiments
by individual teachers with course organization and materials. An inquiry into the relationship between the developments in legal philosophy
and in legal education is projected for a subsequent part of this study.
For present purposes, we are concerned primarily with the immediate
antecedents of the events at Columbia in the late Twenties.'
At the close of World War I, the curriculum of the Columbia Law
School was, on the whole, a conventional one. There was an emphasis
on constitutional law which was uncommon among law schools at that
time and which may have reflected the close relationship which was
TION By T=E FACULTY or LAw

or CoLUmmI.A U

ivtsrr- (1928), hereinafter cited as

STunIEs), in 195 pages, prepared by Professor Oliphant. Copies of the
Summary were distributed to member schools of the Association of American Law
Schools in 1928, with a covering letter from Dean Young B. Smith emphasizing Its
tentative character and requesting that it "not be quoted as representing the conclusions of this Faculty." Quotations in this study are to be interpreted with that
qualification in mind.
2Nevertheless, a reminder is in order that the movement was neither confined
to one school nor the product of mundane curricular difficulties alone. In 1919,
Dean Swan of the Yale Law School was saying: "In all the universities closer
connection should be established between the schools of law and the departments
Swan,
of social science, political science, economics, history, and psychology."
Reconstruction and the LegaZ Profession, 28 YATiE L.J. 784, 794 (1919). In 1928-29,
the Institute of Human Relations was founded at Yale, marking "the culmination
of a movement that had been going forward in the University for a long period.
In the Law School it took the form of an attempt to place the law among the social
sciences by studying its background and actual operation." The faculty abandoned the course in domestic relations and began constructing one in family law
"that should have some relation to what is going on in the world." It looked forward to "an effective combination of the procedural, psychological, and sociological
aspects of crime that will present this problem in a new and significant way."
YATIE UNrvEnsrr, RErToT OF THE DEAN, SCHOoL OF LAW (Hutchins) 5, 6 (192829). In the following year, three courses in business units were announced (Management, Losses, and Finance), and one in credit transactions; the course In
torts was given by an economist (Walton H. Hamilton). Id. (Clark) at 4, 5, 9, 10
(1929-30). Clearly, the ideas at work were widespread and fundamental. The focus
of the present segment of this study on Columbia is explained by the fact that no
other school undertook the application of those ideas so systematically nor left
such an explicit record of the educational policy involved. Perhaps with an eye on
the ambitious activities at Columbia, Dean Clark said: "Our plan has been not
to attempt a wholesale reorganization of the curriculum at a venture, but to experiment along definite lines and make final changes after our efforts have been tested by actual classroom use." Id. at 11.
SummAny OF
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established between the Law School and the political science department
in the time of Lieber and Burgess.- There were, and had been for some
time, courses in Roman law, modem civil law, and legal history, and
the "better class" of students were urged to take some of these.' There
was a course in historical and comparative jurisprudence, which may
have been inspired to some extent by the Redlich report.5 Apart from
these features, and predominantly, the curriculum was devoted to the
doctrinal categories of equity and the common law which had long since
become standard in American law schools.
In the course of the next five years, however, some unorthodox tendencies emerged. Even while bringing out a second edition of the basically
doctrinal casebook on bills and notes of which he was co-editor, Professor Underhill Moore was at work on a book designed to present the subject in terms of the business function of commercial paper." In 1922-23,
two novel courses appeared in the third-year program: Industrial Relations, taught by Professor Noel T. Dowling, and Illegal Combinations
(which in the following year became Trade Regulation), taught by
Professor Herman Oliphant.' At the same time, a course in legal economics, offered by Professor Robert L. Hale, was introduced into the
list of "special courses." 8 To students looking forward to careers in
government, the law faculty was commending courses under the Faculty
of Political Science, with the objective of supplementing the instruction
in "private municipal law" offered by the Law School. The attention of
graduate students was being drawn to courses in the School of Political
Science, the School of Business, and the Department of Philosophy by
way of indicating the availability of instruction in "matters more or less
intimately connected with the study of law." '
It was the development of the courses in industrial relations and trade
regulation, with their challenge to the accepted taxonomy of the law
and their disturbing impact on the unity and the proportions of the curriculum, which was directly responsible for the extensive studies which
BULL. OF INFORMATION: CATALOGUE 194 et seq. (1918As to Lieber and Burgess, see Part Two, 3 J.LEGAL EDuc. 331, 377 et seq.

3 COLUMBIA Urv=EInsrr

19).

(1951).
4 CATALOGUE 194 (1918-19); Stone, Papers and Discussion Concerning the Redliclh Report, 4 AU.L.ScHooL REv. 91, 94 (1916).
5 CATALOGUE 194 (1918-19); Stone, supranote 4, at 94.
6 Llewellyn, Book Review, 22 CoLum.L.IRv. 770 (1922).
7 CATALOGUE 246 (1922-23); SCHOOL OF LAw ANNOUNCEMENT 28 (1923-24).
8 CATALOGUE 246 (1922-23); SCHOOL OF LAW A NOUNCEMENT 30 (1923-24). Special courses were open to all except first-year students, but not more than six points
earned in such courses could be counted toward the LL.B. degree. Other courses

in the list were Admiralty, English Legal History, History of European Law,
Law of Water Rights, Legal Research and the Use of Law Books, Modern Civil
Law, Rate Regulation, Readings in the Digests of Justinian, and Statutes.
9 SCHooL OF LAw ANNouNcEMNr 16, 33 (1923-24).
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the faculty undertook four years later.10 This is a fact worthy of more
than passing notice. Nowadays the phrases "functional approach" and
"integrati6n of nonlegal materials" are, to a number of law teachers, trite
symbols of frustration. It is enlightening to recall that the essence of
what these symbols represent is embodied in two such familiar and thoroughly established components of the law curriculum. The realization
that modern legal education has profited, at least in some of its departments, from the movement toward functionalism and integration gives
focus to the problem of understanding that movement: After so durable
a beginning, why did the development bog down? Was it that the ideas
involved were workable only in a few special areas, so that their force
had been substantially spent before they became a cause? Was it because of stubborn conservatism on the part of law teachers generally? Was it because the extension of the new ideas to the entire curriculum was pressed too rapidly and with too much zeal? Was it because something of basic professional and predagogical value was sacrificed by a method which loosed legal education's moorings in the doctrinal
systematics of law-a sacrifice which could be tolerated in only a few
specialties superimposed on a fundamentally doctrinal curriculum? Was
it because some teachers departed from original purposes and sought
to direct the development along lines unacceptable to some who had
welcomed the initial experiments? Was it that the contribution of the
social sciences was relatively obscure and inaccessible, or even nonexistent, so that law teachers despaired of the task they had set themselves?
Was it, perhaps, because the new treatment exposed issues which the
law schools were not ready to confront and revealed too sharply the
element of human judgment in a system which had been widely regarded
as impersonal?
Considering the sharpness of the break they made with tradition, the
new courses evoked surprisingly little criticism when they were announced. They filled a need which was recognized among a wide circle
of teachers and practicing lawyers, and there was no necessity for an elaborate theoretical justification of the development." The importance of
10 "For a number of years an increasing number of individual members of the
. had been studying and discussing some of the major defects In
Faculty . .
legal education. This unorganized activity resulted In important changes In some

of the courses offered in the Law School and in the introduction of two new courses conceived and organized along functional lines, namely, Industrial Relations

and Trade Regulation. It served also to kindle general interest in the matter and
resulted in the Faculty's voting to undertake a comprehensive study of the whole
subject of legal education with the view to devising, and putting into effect, plans
for its improvement." SutmmAny oF STUDIEs 5.
3a Oliphant's casebook (Cases on Trade Regulation (1923)) did not even contain
a preface. Professor Francis Sayre, of Harvard, whose book (Cases on Labor Law
(1922)) was .used in the course on industrial relations, devoted less than a page to
preliminary explanation, the only reference to the novelty of the work being con-
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labor problems and of government control of business had become apparent; ' equally apparent was the fact that inadequate preparation for
a lawyer's dealing with such problems was afforded by the scant attention
which could be given them in the standard courses through which'the
relevant materials were scattered. Opinion was well prepared, for such
a development. Indeed, neither course originated in Columbia's hotbed
of discontent: both had previously been offered at Harvard.' 3 Reviewers almost with one voice welcomed the casebooks which accompanied
the new courses-Sayre's Cases on Labor Law and Oliplhant's Cases on
Trade Regulation-though most of them were somewhat perturbed on
account of the problems of curricular adjustment which were.foreshadowed. The new casebooks borrowed materials from various basic
courses, and the question arose: Was there to be duplication, or were
these materials to be withdrawn from the basic courses where the doctrinal context afforded the optimum setting for study? By and large,
the reviewers were inclined to regard this as a minor problem, when
measured alongside the improvement which the"new casebooks offered.
Thus, Professor Cathcart was willing to accept the consequence ofduplication, as he indicated in a review of Oliphant's book:
But by including chapters on intimidation, disparaging goods 'and services,
inducing breach of contract and boycotting, he selems; in the interest of
logical completeness, to have claimed for the course'in'trade regulation a
substantial part of the course in torts. Should these topics be omitted from
.
[I]t is submitted that although important problems in
torts? .
tained in the casual sentence:. "Labor law has in recent years been attracting
widespread attention, and in response to the growing demand for an adequate'collection of cases on the subject this volume is published."
12 Early in 1923, the American Bar Association Journal began carrying, as a regular feature, "Trade Regulation-a Department Devoted to a Review of Recent Federal Trade Commission Rulings and of Court Decisions Relating to Unfair Competitive Practices." The contributor was Professor Oliphant. 9 A.B.A.J. 210 (1923).
13 In 1920, Professor Francis Sayre inaugurated the course in labor law at Harvard. Dowling, Book Review, 23 Conum.L.REv. 202, 203 (1923). In 1916-17, Professor Albert M. Kales gave a course at Harvard in Contracts and Combinations in
Restraint of Trade, using his own casebook on that subject, published in 1916, and
in 1918, he published Ga short parallel text. I have been unable to locate a copy of
the casebook, or even a review, of it. But the Prefatory Note in the text contains
this statement: "In this summary I have attempted to connect the prohibitions of
the courts upon the freedom of economic action with the economic facts and principles upon which' they rest. I have attempted in the text to balance economic considerations. In the notes are incorporated many quotations to indicate the economic
facts aid principles which the courts take cognizance of in'reaching their conclusions. By this means I have sought not only to make an anaylsis of results but to
illustrate a technique of reasoning." KALEs, CoNxm.Acs AND COMBINATIoNS IN
RESTRAINT OF TRADE iii (1918). McLaughlin's bibliography notices this volume as
"a small theoretical legal treatise. . . . It is sound, elementary, and almost
the only strictly legal work worth notice. Since the problems involved are largely
economic, however, it is only a point of departure and not a key to ultimate truth."
JAmEs A. McLAuGHIJN, CASES Ol THE FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST LAWS OF THE UITED
,STATES 705 (2d ed. 1933).
14 23 CoLum.L.REv. 697-98 (1923).
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present day competitive practices are, and owing to time limitations must be,
inadequately treated in the course in torts, these problems cannot be regarded
as purely factual and isolated from their doctrinal setting in law. .
.
The truth is that from a pedagogical standpoint much good and no substantial harm can come from treating these topics in both courses, in the one
somewhat generally, in the other intensively. Here, as in the case of labor
law, a certain amount of duplication will be advantageous.
One reviewer permitted his concern over this problem to develop into
doubt as to the justification of the entire project: 15
The recognition of these familiar cases . . . again raises sharply
the question whether a course based on this collection of authorities will not
prove to be, in so far as it deals with "straight law," but a rehearsal under
special states of fact, of principles necessarily treated in other courses, and,
in so far as it treats of sociology, out of place in the law school.
In the chorus of approval, there was only one note that sounded like intractable conceptualism. In a laudatory review of Trade Regulation,
Professor Robert S. Stevens inserted a dictum questioning the development of labor law as a separate course: 1 6
There is room for criticism, however, of the policy and need of giving
isolated attention to the law with regard to the problems involved in buying
and selling labor and in buying and selling commodities. The principles
underlying the law of conspiracies, of restraint of trade, of competitive
methods, and of illegal combinations, control the liberty of the individual
and protect the public whether the individual is attempting to make his living
by the sale of his goods or the sale of his labor. Vastly more important than
saving the student from duplication of material presented, is the opportunity that is afforded for emphasizing the correlation of legal principles
which affect the vendor of goods and the vendor of labor.
The new courses differed in three ways from the traditional pattern.
The first difference, of course, consisted in the organization of materials
in terms of social and economic problems rather than of legal doctrine.
The course in trade regulation was based on segments of Contracts and
Torts and cut across Equity, Criminal Law, Corporations, and perhaps
other traditional categories; Industrial Relations borrowed from Contracts, Torts, Agency, Equity, and Constitutional Law, among others.
15 Vance, Book Review, 36 HxAv.L.R-v. 634, 636 (1923), reviewing Sayre's Cases

on Labor Law.

16 8 ConuNELL L.Q. 405, 406 (1923). The comments in the text are based on the
following reviews in addition to those which have been quoted: of FRANCIS
SA nE, CASES ON LABoR LAW: Llewellyn, Book Review, 33 YALE L.J. 226 (1923);

Goodrich, Book Review, 21 MxcH.L.REv. 716 (1923); and Dowling, Book Review,

23 COLu.L.REV. 202 (1923); of HERMAN T. OLIPHANT,

CASES

ON

TRADE

REGULA-

Tiox: Henderson, Book Review, 36 HARv.L.REv. 1045 (1923); Haines, Book Review, 33 YALE L.J. 224 (1923); Magill, Book Review, 21 MIIcr.L.REv. 825 (1923);
and Frankfurter, Book Review, 72 U.PA.L.REv. 335 (1924).
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Secondly, both courses proceeded on the assumption that certain non17 Oliphant's caselegal materials were directly and pointedly relevant.
book opened with thirty-three pages of economic history. Sayre, besides
referring to economic and sociological studies, printed as an appendix
a report on minimum subsistence and comfort budgets.' 8 A connection
is traceable here which throws clear light on the purposes to be served
by nonlegal studies. In his brief in Muller v. Oregon,' fourteen years
earlier, Brandeis had demonstrated how economic and sociological materials could be used to win a lawsuit; the significance of that develop-

ment for the training of lawyers was beginning to be appreciated. Thirdly, both courses utilized statutory materials to an extent which was unusual. This was particularly true of Trade Regulation (Oliphant's casebook carried the texts of the Sherman Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act, and the Webb Act as an appendix); but Sayre gave considerable attention to the historical role of legislation in labor problems, to
modem regulatory legislation, to systems of compulsory arbitration in
other countries, and to workmen's compensation. In this difference, as
well as in the first two, the two courses embodied the new idea in legal
education; for the attention given to legislative measures emphasized
the role of creative reason, as opposed to deduction from a priori principles, in the solution of social and legal problems.
The record does not show precisely the course of developments at
Columbia during the next four years leading to the decision to re-examine
the whole field of legal education; but the general outline can be reconstructed with some confidence. The probability is that the problems of
curricular adjustment-toward which the reviewers, on the whole, had
adopted a sanguine attitude-proved unexpectedly troublesome in practice. Granting that the new courses filled a need, had the Law School
adequately met that need simply by adding them to a curriculum which
already had more content than could be covered in three years? The
student who elected one of these specialties did so at the cost of forgoing
some traditional subject; the consequent loss in terms of information
and of doctrinal training was bound to cause concern. As for making
room for the new courses by reducing the time allotted to those from
which materials had been borrowed, it is not to be supposed that the
1:7 "The assumption underlying Professor Oliphqnt's Cases is that a prerequisite
to the law's capacity to deal with these problems is the conscious formulation of
the issues and the systematic analysis of the factors entering into any accommodation. To that end the various considerations by which the law's balance is strucklogical coherence, history, social environment, the source and knowledge of relevant data, society's presuppositions ('the inarticulate major premise')-must be
brought together in a comprehensive whole and systematically tested." Frankfur.
ter, Book Review, 72 U.P.L.Rnv. 335, 336, (1924).
18 SAYRE, CASES ON LABoR LAw 672, 717, 800, 875, 954-55, 993 (1922).
19 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
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Columbia faculty was devoid of that reasoned possessiveness which Professor Gathcart had expressed in his review, and which is always evoked
by proposals to -take away an hour. Yet, the student who did not take
Industrial Relations and Trade Regulation was missing something of
acknowledged importance. The problem must have assumed alarming
proportions as the prospect of additional new courses, similarly constructed, began to open. The first two experiments had been favorably
received, and numerous institutions and problems suggested themselves
as susceptible of similar treatment: the family, the business organization,
the marketing process, crime. The flame spread through the faculty, and
there is no reason to suppose that such a crusader as Oliphant was innocent 'of incendiarism. By 1926, the graduate curriculum was devoted
almost entirely to seminars of the institutional type and was clearly serving as a'proving ground for ideas which were clamoring for inclusion
in the undergraduate course. At the same time, the list of "other Officers giving instruction in the Law School" was expanded to include professors of political economy, philosophy, social legislation, business administration, finance, transportation, economics, government, and marketing.2" The problem of what was to happen to the curriculum had
become acute.
At some point early in this four-year period, the idea was developed
that the solution to the problem was to reorganize the entire course of
study along functional lines. This is a fact of basic importance. It
provides the central theme for the studies of legal education which the
faculty undertook; it accounts for the paradox that inclusion of nonlegal
materials in the course of study was actually advocated as a simplification
device-as part of a scheme for enabling the Law School to keep pace
with the skyrocketing demands of an increasingly complex legal system;
and it provides, also, one possible key to understanding the fate which
overtook the movement. The idea was variously expressed by spokesmen for the proposed reorganization, but it is never so intelligible as
when it is considered in the setting of the familiar problem of accommodating competing demands for the law student's time. In its simplest
form, the argument went somewhat like this: The difficulty grows out
of the attempt to engraft specialty courses of the functional type on a
course of study that is fundamentally doctrinal. As long as the law
school clings to the doctrinal classifications as the basis of instruction,
duplication is inevitable; but duplication can be eliminated if functional
classifications are consistently substituted throughout the curriculum.
There is nothing sacred about a particular scheme of classification; since
the new system has proved its utility in certain fields, it is worth trying
20 SCHOOL OF LAW A.NOUNCEmENT 3, 32 et seq. (1926-27).
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in others and should be applied to others for the purpose of removing
an obstacle to its employment in the fields to which it has beer Succ~ssfully applied.
Dean of the Law School during the formative years of this movement
was Harlan Fiske Stone, surely no visionary pedagogical theorist. 21 It
would be inaccurate to refer to him as the leader of the movement;
clearly, the driving force was supplied by Oliphant.22 Nevertheless,
Stone had appreciated the implicatiQns of sociological jurisprudence for
legal education as early as 1915 ; 23 and, as the spirit of innovation began
-to spread through the curriculum and to suggest an institutional policy,
he became its official spokesman. In the very act of explaining the new
directions which were being taken by the Columbia faculty's thinking, he
took occasion to affirm his distrust of "educational nostrums" springing
from "a kind of competitive zeal

.

.

[t]he desire to do some-

thing distinctive, to give some evidence of originality, to attract public
attention, or to secure patronage . . . .1,24 At about the same time,
he openly questioned whether there could be any such thing as a methodology built upon sociological jurisprudence which would have utility for
either legal education or the judicial process. 25 But the fact that he was
21 A graduate of the Columbia Law School In the time of .Keener, Stone came
to the deanship in 1910 with seven years of experience as a -partner in a New
York law firm as well as with teaching experience. In 1923, he resigned to re-enter
the practice; in 1924, he was appointed Attorney General; the following year, he
was appointed to the Supreme Court, and in 1941, became Chief Justice. See Smith,
Harlan Fiske Stone: Teacher, Scholar and Dean, 46 COLU.L.REv. 700 (1946).
- 22 It was Oliphant who acknowledged an inspiration to this kind of reform dating from 1914. Ass'x oF Am. L. SCHOOLS, HANIDBooK 52-53 (1928); see Part One, 3
J.LEGAL EDUC. 331, 335 (1951). It was he who devised Columbia's first functional
course and casebook (on trade regulation). The casebook, incidentally, was dedicated to Professor Leon C. Marshall, of the University of Chicago School. of Business, who was later chosen to preside over the Columbia faculty's studies. It was
Oliphant who was chosen to summarize for publication the studies made by the
faculty. The memoranda of the Marshall conferences are replete with evidences
of his leadership. And see note 36 infra.
23 COLUmBIA UNIVERSITY, REPORT OF THE DEAN OF THE SCHOOL OF LAW 7, 15

(1915); id. at 8 (1916).
24 The Future of Legal Education,10 A.B.A.J. 233 (1924).
25 "Growing recognition of this truth has led legal thinkers In recent years to
subject the judicial process to critical examination, and to direct their energies toward the discovery of some principle, some 'methodology' whereby case law might
be guided to a development more systematic, more consistent with principle and
more harmonious with social needs. The result of these investigations has- been to
place great emphasis on the 'method of sociology' or 'sociological jurisprudence'
and to establish in our legal thinking that trinity of judicial theory-logic, history
and the 'method of sociology'-as the source of all true legal doctrine. We are told
that the application of logic and history must be tempered by the 'method of
sociology,' and that we must enlarge our scheme of jurisprudence so as to embrace
within it the operations of a program of 'social engineering.'
"It 4s not a novel idea, that in declaring law the judge must envisage the social
utility of the rule which he creates. In short, he must know his facts out of which
the legal rule is to be extracted and in a large sense they embrace the social and
economic data of his time. Many years ago, Mr. Justice Holmes in classic phrase
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a conservative and critical participant rather than a dedicated leader
makes his interpretation of the movement all the more significant. The
ideas which he could advance by way of public explanation were only
those which had passed the test of his skepticism.
Stone's report as dean for the year 1923 was the first comprehensive
exposition of the ideas involved in the agitation for reorganization of
the Columbia curriculum.2 "Present day problems of legal education,"
he wrote,

"

.

arise

.

.

from our traditional attitude

toward the law as a body of technical doctrine more or less detached
from those social forces which it regulates. We have failed to recognize as clearly as we might that law is nothing more than a form of
social control intimately related to those social functions which are the
subject matter of economics and the social sciences generally." 27 Then
he turned, rather abruptly, from this philosophical theme to the familiar,
practical problems of the expanding curriculum. The preceding fifty
years had witnessed an enormous expansion in the coverage and content
of the law; the response of the law schools had been to add more and
more courses-Stone mentioned, among others, Unfair Competition,
Restrictions on Trade, and Industrial Relations--"and withal every inreminded us that 'the life of the law is not logic but experience.' If this Is what
is meant by the sociological method and by sociological jurisprudence, It Is the
method which the wise and competent judge has used from time Immemorial In
rendering the dynamic decision which makes the law a living force. Holt, Hardwick, Mansfield, Marshall and Shaw employed it long before the phrase sociological
jurisprudence was thought of. But can we in any proper sense speak of the application of this principle as a 'method'? Has sociological jurisprudence any methodology, any formulae, or any principles which can be taught or expounded so as
to make it a guide either to the student of law or to the judge? History and logic
are guides but has sociological engineering been reduced to a science and does It
embody such formulae or principles as will enable the judge to render a just' decision except by the application of that practical wisdom which characterizes the
decision of the great judge and distinguishes him from those who are not so great?
If not, then sociological jurisprudence will not tend to reduce the accumulation of
anomalous doctrines; it may even add to it. At most it warns the judge and the
student of law that logic and history cannot, and ought not, to have full sway
when the dynamic judgment is to be rendered. It points out that In the choice of
the particular legal device determining the result, social utility, the mores of the
times, objectively determined, may properly turn the scale in favor of one and
against the other; and it should lead us as lawyers and students of law to place
an appropriate emphasis on the study of special data and on the effort to understand the relation of law to them, because by that process we may lay the foundatibn for a better understanding of what social utility is and where In a given case
the path of social utility lies. Sociological jurisprudence, rightly understood, ought
to give a new inspiration and a new trend to legal development, but we must have
Other resources if we are to make of the common law the great and abiding system
which it may become." Stone, Some Aspects of the Problem of Law Simplifleation,
23 CoLu.L.REV. 319, 327-28 (1923).
26 COLUMIA UicmVERSmy, REPORT OF TIlE DEAN OF THE SCHOOL O

LAW ([1923)

The substance of this report is contained in the article, Stone, The Future of Legal
Education, 10 A.B.A.J. 233, 5 Am.L.ScHOOL REV. 329 (1924). References herein will
be to the more conveniently available article.
27 Stone, The Future of Legal Education, 10 A.B.A.J. 233, 234 (1924).
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structor continuously and persistently presses for an increase in the time
allotted to his subject in order that he may treat adequately its ever expanding technique." I He rejected as futile the minor mechanical expedients which had been advanced: superficial treatment of lesser
courses, elimination of overlapping, and the extension of the law school
course to four years.2 In the statement of his solution of the problem,
he returned to his introductory theme: 30
Instead of dissipating our energies in the vain attempt to master in the
brief period of three years the vast and growing mass of technical learning
of our profession as an independent and detached system, we must seek a
simplification of educational methods by coming closer to those energizing
forces which are producing the technical doctrine of the law. We may hope
to do this by reaching a clearer and more accurate understanding of the relation of law to those social functions which it endeavors to control and by
studying its rules and doctrines as tools or devices created and placed in
the hands of the lawyer as means of effecting that control.
In the execution of this policy, two subsidiary problems would be involved. The first was that of "so rearranging and organizing the subjects of law school study as to make more apparent the relationship of
the various technical devices of the law to the particular social or economic function with which they are concerned .
'""' Such a
functional classification had, of course, been basic to the concept of the
courses in trade regulation and industrial relations. By way of illustrating how the idea could be applied elsewhere in the curriculum, Stone ad-'
vocated the development of two other courses which have likewise become familiar: Creditors' Rights, which would assemble materials from
courses on procedure, equity, practice, trusts, and bankruptcy; 32 and'
28 Ibid.
29 His rejection of the four-year course is significant in view of the point, made
earlier in this study (3 J.LEGAL EDUC. 331, 332 n.3), that the integration move-

ment is not to be indiscriminately identified with the various four-year plans.
Stone was attracted to the reorganization plan, with its resort to non-legal materials, as a promising alternative to such devices. A fourth year, merely as such,
would operate only to allow the law school to catch up temporarily with the expanding mass of legal materials. Yet, the Columbia faculty did not take a position
inconsistent with Stone's when, a few years later, it reconciled itself to the probability that a program of reorganization and integration, such as Stone had suggested, would require the addition of a year to the curriculum. Stone himself
doubtless would have agreed that a fourth year was justified if its addition were
necessary to accommodate a type of treatment which might stabilize the curriculum
and ward off indefinite expansion.
30 Stone, The Future of Legal Education, 10 A.B.A.J. 233, 234 (1924).
31 Ibid.
32 Id. at 235. Cf. the Preface to Jom HAtNA, CASES A2ND MATERIALS ON CREDIToRs' ]RIGHTS (1931). Some years earlier, Garrard Glenn had published a text on the
same subject, containing "the' substance of a special course of lectures delivered
at the Law School of Columbia University. . . ." GAR ARD GLENN, THE RIGHtTS
AND REMEDIES OF CREDITORS RESPECTING THEIR DEBTOR'S PROPERTY (1915).
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Security, which wofild draw together, on the basis of their common function, all security devices, regardless of their disparate origins and con33
ceptual classifications.
But no reclassification, merely as such, could rise above the level of a
mechanical solution. The particular virtue of the functional classification was that it would reveal the relationship of law to social functions;
it would make clear the relevance and facilitate the application of other
stores of knowledge and understanding about those functions. Reclassification and the resort to extra-legal insights into social processes were
inseparable parts of the simplification scheme. The second problem of
execution, therefore, had to do with the training of law students in thesocial sciences. Stone put the problem solely in terms of prelegal education. "It is, I think, quite obvious that if law is a study of a method
of social and economic control, then the student in order to be adequately
prepared, for its study ought, not only to have good mental discipline, but
he ought to have a thorough-going knowledge of the social functions.
with which the law deals." 3' He expressed dissatisfaction with the
training afforded by the undergraduate departments as reflected in the!
capacities 'of law students: too often that training was unsystematic,
sup&rficial;, or fragmentary. In closing, he called for development in the'
college6' 6f courses of study which would provide a basic understanding
of the'social and economic order.
The language of Dean Stone's report was matter-of-fact. There was.
no 1roclanation'of a new era; there were only the rather worried comments of a: dean on the perennial problem of how the law school is to.
do its' job. 'Yet; in context, in the history of legal education, the report
was 'a document of major significance. It affirmed a relationship between law afid other social studies which had been neglected or denied
for nearly a century. The relationship was one so vital that, according
to this thesis, effective legal education was dependent on other social
studies: What'was to be done if it should develop that no satisfactory
arrangements could be worked out to insure adequate pre-legal training
in the's'ocial' sciences? In that event, unless Stone's thesis was to be
abandoned, its logic required that the necessary social science training
be prov'ided in the law. school itself. This was precisely the line along,
which the thinking at Columbia developed. When, three years after
Dean Stone's. report, the faculty, under Dean Jervey, turned its organized
energies to the task of putting the program into execution, it was confronted almost at once with the realization that to require a competence
in the necessary social studies as a condition of admission to the Law
33 Stone, The Future of Legal Bducation, 10 A.B.A.J. 233, 235 (1924).
Preface ,to JoHN HIAmA, OASES AND MATERIALS ox SECURITY (1932).
34 Stone; The Future of Legal Bucation, 10 A.B.A.J. 233, 235 (1924).
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School would be impracticable. It would be difficult for the Law School
to define the training it desired; it would be difficult to persuade colleges
to offer precisely what was defined; and the Law School cbuld controt
the quality of the work done only by a rigid system of entrance examinations.3" A more significant objection was also voiced: "Such training
though good will always remain a background., Only the heat bf contemporary study can adequately fuse the two bodies of knowledge." 36
Accordingly, the faculty found itself faced with the question whefher it
was under "a minimum duty of partly meeting the problem- by fusing
(not scrambling and not making available in parallel courses) certain
social science material with legal material." 37 It came to answer the
question in the affirmative, with enthusiasm, as the potentialities of such
a program began to unfold: "Training openly directed toward th endof inculcating the scientific attitude is needed in thkr law school
.
.
. .3
[T]hat nonlegal material which is necessary for givingthe course. in a fertile manner is just the material which needs to be
poured into the teaching of law.

.

.

.3

_A reorganization of legal

education will require the addition of much new material including
methodological matter and matter drawn from philosophy and especially
from the other social sciences." 40 When the deliberations reached this
stage, the modem movement toward integration of n6nlegal materials
with the law school curriculum had been defined.

This definition, it has been suggested, was, at' least lotentially, an
epoch-making event in American legal education. When Dean Stone
35 SUMMA.R or STUDIES 42; Document No. 27. See also Documents 5, 6, 12, 15,
20, 21, 22, 29, 48, 62, 64.
38 Document No. 62 (Oliphant) at 547. This document was published (Oliphant,
!ihe Future of Legal Education, 6 AM.L.ScHoooL PRv. "329 (1928)) with a note explaining that it had been written for private circulation six Vears earlier-an explanation which sheds further light on the specific origins of the Columbia studies.
In at least some instances, the "carry-over" from college work to work in the
law school was regarded as "insignificant." SUMMARY OF STUrES 88.
37 SUMMARY oF STuIEns 43. It was thus that the four-year element came into the
discussions. "It seems clear that, when there is added to the present law school
curriculum the amount of new material necessary ,to make it a well rounded and
liberalizing thing, it will be necessary for a student to spend more than three
years in the Law School. . . . If . . . the time which the student spends
in the law school is to be increased so that this new material may be fused with
the legal material to which law students have hitherto been exposed, a year must be
added either at the beginning or at the end of the present law school course." Id.
at 37, 39. This was a prospect which no one faced with enthusiasm. The feeling
was that postponement of the student's entry into professional life had already gone
as far as it could go consistently with the best interests of the student and of
society. Document No. 27 at 114; SUMMARY OF STUnS 35. (Columbia required
three years of college for admission to the three-year law course.)
38 SUMAxR OF STuDnS 88. (Italics supplied.)

39 Id. at 86.
40 Id. at 12.
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wrote his report in 1923, there lay behind him three well-marked periods
in terms of attitudes toward the place and function of nontechnical
studies in the university training of the lawyer. 4 ' The first was the
period of the "academical" professorships, beginning in 1779 with George
Wythe at William and Mary and continuing with James Wilson, James
Kent, George Nicholas, Henry St. George Tucker, David Hoffman,
and Isaac Parker. In this period, a college education was esteemed not
only for its cultural, social, and political values, but also for its practical
contribution to the lawyer's professional competence. 2 Moreover, the
university study of law itself was closely linked with philosophy, political economy, and ethics-that is, with the whole body of knowledge
concerning social problems. The second period began when the university law schools, or departments, founded at Virginia and Harvard in
the broad tradition of the professorships, eliminated educational requirements for admission and adopted a narrowly technical definition of
the scope of legal education itself. This they did reluctantly, under the
multiple pressures exerted by extreme democratic doctrine, competition
from inferior institutions for law study, and the expanding mass and
complexity of technical materials. Almost at once, however, enduring
justification for the isolated position thus assumed was forthcoming
in the analytical jurisprudence of John Austin-a declaration of the
independence of legal science from philosophy and morals.43 During the
next half-century, there was virtually no formal correlation of general
education with the study of law. Law school curricula were confined to
technical subjects, educational entrance requirements were nonexistent,
and, except in the South, parallel work in college and law school was discouraged. The third period was that of the restoration of educational
requirements for admission to law school. This change of attitude did
not reflect a renewed appreciation of any vital relationship between law
and other disciplines. Its purpose was to make the law school population reasonably homogeneous and as literate as possible, and to help
close the "easy-swinging doors" of the profession against "the idle, the
41 See generally Part Two, 3 J.LEGAL EDuc. 331, 341 et seq. (1951).
42 "The law is a science . . . unavoidably and intimately connected with the
affairs of human life. . . . Forms, however necessary an acquaintance with

them may be for conducting aright the concerns of mankind, are still but the ensigns of human weakness; they are therefore to be considered only In their relative qualities; the regulations they mark out are adapted not to the elevation, but
to the depression of the human intellect, which is incapable of receiving many
ideas, or of comprehending many objects at once. . . . Besides, I am induced to
believe, that by thus understanding the connection between the forms and the
spirit of your profession, you will be enabled to act a superior part even in the very
sphere which technical men have appropriated to themselves." JoiN RAITHnY
[?], THE STUDY AND PRACTICE OF THE LAw 141, 143, 144 (1st American ed. 1806).
43Austin's Province of Jurisprudence Determined was originally published in
1832.
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lazy, and the unprepared." " The movement reached its peak-indeed,
attained almost its full development-when the Association of American
Law Schools, in 1921, adopted the resolution which required its members, by 1925, to establish an admission requirement of two years of college work.45 Dean Stone wrote his report for 1923 just at the close
of this period, and the valuation he placed on nontechnical studies draws
significance from what had gone before."'
It is instructive to compare the developments at Columbia in the 1920's
with those at Harvard in the 1820's, and to do so in terms of the leading
spokesmen for the respective developments: Harlan F. Stone and
Joseph Story.4' Like Story, Stone was a leader in legal education as
the head of a national law school in a time of change; like Story, he was
to become, in addition, one of the great justices of the Supreme Court
of the United States. Each of the two men had profound faith in the
common law; 4 each of them was apprehensive on account of its enormous and uncontrolled growth through the multiplication of ad hoc
determinations.4 9 Facing this problem as jurist and educator, each expressed his distrust of codification as a remedy 5 0 and placed his faith in44 Finch, Legal Education, 1 COLU.L.REv. 94, 103 (1901).
45 Ass's oF Am.L.ScooLs, HANDOOK 123-433 (1921). A

belated further step was
taken in 1950-51, when the American Bar Association and the Association of American Law Schools advanced the requirement, or standard, to three years. After
thirty years, the effective motivation of this type of requirement remained substantially unchanged. See Ass'N. OF A.L.SCHooLs, HANDB oK 17, 64 et seq. (1950).
46 No doubt the temptation to be precise about the preceding three periods should
be resisted, but the significant dates apear to be: 1779 (establishment of the professorship of "Law and Police" at William and Mary); 1829 (reorganization of the
Harvard Law School under Story); 1874-75 (establishment of educational requirements for admission by Columbia, Yale, and Harvard); 1921 (action by the Association of American Law Schools requiring two years of college for admission).
47 No more is claimed than that these men were spokesmen for the educational
policies in question. The reasons for not attributing to Stone a more direct responsibility for the developments at Columbia have been stated above; as to Story,
see Part Two, 3 J.LEnG EDUC. 331, 361-367 (1951).
48 Story, Address before the Suffolk Bar, 1 Am.TuRIST 1 (1829); STORY, Inaugural
Discourse, MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS 440 (1835); Stone, Some Aspects of the .Problem of Law Simplification, 23 COLu.L.REv. 319, 321, 326 (1923).
49 "More than one hundred and fifty volumes of reports are already published, containing a mass of decisions.

.

.

.

The danger indeed seems to be

.

.

. that

. . The mass of the
we shall be overwhelmed with their number and variety. .
law is, to be sure, accumulating with an almost incredible rapidity, and with this
accumulation, the labor of students as well as professors, is seriously augmenting.
It is impossible not to look without some discouragement upon the ponderous volumes, which the next half century will add to the groaning shelves of our jurists."
Story, Address before the Suffoik Bar, I Am.JURIST 1, 13, 31 (1829). See also his
Inaugural Discourse, MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS 440, 459 (1835). For a similar
lament by Stone a century later, see the article cited in note 48 supra, at page 320.
50 "We ought not to permit ourselves to indulge in the theoretical extravagances
of some well meaning philosophical jurists, who believe, that all human concerns
for the future can be provided for in a code speaking a definite language." Story,
Address before the Suffolk Bar, 1 A.JURIST 1, 31-32 (1829). "Codification . . .
has always been anathema to those trained in the methods and habits of thought
of the English common law. . .
. [Ely the very process of codification we
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stead in a systematic restatement of legal principles. For Story, the
"one adequate remedy" was the gradual compilation of a digest, modeled
on the Pandects of Justinian, of those principles of law which had acquired scientific accuracy; by this means, he hoped "in a great measure,
[to] get rid of the necessity of appealing to volumes, which contain
jarring and discordant opinions

.

.

.

.""- Stone, likewise invoking

the experience of Rome, had a surer basis for his hope that a restatement
of the law might be realized; the plans of Mr. Elihu Root were well
.advanced, and the American Law Institute was to be organized within
the month.5' How closely their views coincided may be judged from the
position to which each would have assigned such a digest, or restatement,
in the hierarchy of authority. In Story's conception, while the digest
might supersede "the immense collections of former times, and [leave]
them to perish in oblivion," it was obvious that it could "apply only to
the law, as it has been applied to human concerns in past times
,,;"
it could not be relied on to provide solutions to future
problems. When, in 1836, he came to recommend the "codification"
of certain portions of the common law of Massachusetts, he did so with
important reservations: "
1. The code is to be interpreted and applied to future cases, as a code
of the Common Law of Massachusetts, and not as a code of mere positive
or statute law. It is to be deemed an affirmance of what the Common Law
now is, and not as containing provisions in derogation of that law, and therefore subject to a strict construction.
2. Consequently, it is to furnish the rules for decisions in courts of justice, not only in cases directly (ex directo) within its terms, but indirectly,
and by analogy in cases, where, as a part of the Common Law, it would
and ought to be applied by courts of justice, in like manner .
..
And Stone, seeking to reconcile the idea of a restatement with the system of judge-made law, suggested that the restatement might "receive
legislative recognition and sanction, not as a body of legal rules and doctrine imposed on the courts and litigants as a formal statute or code, but
as 'an aid and guide' to the courts in formulating legal rules, with full
liberty reserved to them to accept and follow'any of the precepts of the
restatement when they conflict with precedent but without making such
action mandatory." 55
would destroy those elements In the common law system which have given it its

vitality and its great practical utility. . . ." Stone, supra note 48, at 329.
51 Story, Address before the Suffolk Bar, 1 Am.JuRIST 1, 31 (1829).
52 The substance of the article cited in note 48 supra was delivered to the Association of the Bar of the City of New York on February 8, 1923. The Institute
was organized on February 23, 1923.
53 Story, Address before the SiuffoZlc Bar, 1 Am.-JuIST 1, 32, 31 (1829).
54 TnE I=
A LETTEns OF JOSEPH STORY 247 (Story ed. 1851).
55 Stone, supra note 48, at 335.
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Here, however, the similarity ends, and a striking contrast appears.
For simplification and mastery of the growing mass of legal materials,
Story relied on "habits of generalization," I to be cultivated by the study
of special pleading, of equity, of f6reign maritime law, of the civil law,
and of the law of nations. The problem was that of applying logical,
historical, and comparative methods to the mass of legal materials.
Accordingly, Story acquiesced in the exclusion from legal studies of the
nontechnical branches of learning with which the university study of law
had formerly been associated. To Stone, on the other hand, the ideal
was not coherence and simplification through internal consistency alone.
The common law should be restated not only systematically but "in the
light of those social and economic functions for the guidance and control
of which law itself exists.

.

.

.

Accordingly, he called for a

return to those studies which would give the student "a thorough-going
knowledge of the social functions with which law deals." 5 The Jonah
of nontechnical studies had been cast overside to lighten and preserve
the ship. His presence on board was now earnestly desired-also to
59
save the ship.

5 Story, Address before the Suffolk Bar, 1 Am.JtXisT 1, 31 (1829).
57 Stone, supra note 48, at 330. (Italics supplied.)
58 Stone, The Future of Legal Education, 10 A.B.A.J. 233, 235 (1924).
59 In the summer of 1941, it was my good fortune to be able to discuss this Interpretation of law school history with Chief Justice Stone. His reaction may be
summarized as follows: (1) He was displeased by the suggested parallel between
his career and that of Story (although no comparison in terms of abilities was intended). He applied to Story the twentieth-century equivalent of a term with
which Story was familiar as a characterization of less esteemed judicial brethren:
the nineteenth-century expression was "a very feeble light." (2) His faith in the
efficacy of restatement as a remedy for the law's complexity had diminished considerably in the light of experience with the work of the American Law Institute.
(3) His conviction as to the importance of social and economic data in the handling
of legal problems had been confirmed and strengthened by his experience on the
Court. Indicating with a gesture the volumes of reports lining the walls of his
library, he said, in effect, that the decisions they contained were of extraordinarily
little help to him in the cases that came before the Court; that a full consideration
of the facts involved and of the practical effect of-the judgment was, for him, the
effective basis of decision. For illustration, be referred to the case of So uth Carolina State Highway Department v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 58 Sup.Ct.
510, 82 L.Ed. 734 (1938). His comments were remarkably similar to what he had

written in U928:

"Lawyers

.

.

. too often go little beyond the challenged:

statute and the citation of authorities in supposedly analogous cases. The court is
thus often left to speculate as to the nature and extent of the social problems giving
rise to the legislative problem, or to discover them by its own researches. Intimate
acquaintance with every aspect of the conditions which have given rise to the
regulatory problems are infinitely more important to the court than are the citation of authorities or the recital of bare formulas. . . . The questions which
come to us are rooted in history and in the social and economic development of
the nation. To grasp their significance our study must be extended beyond the examination of precedents and legal formulas, by reading and research in fields extra-legal, which nevertheless have an intimate relation to the genesis of the legal
rules which we pronounce." Stone, Fifty Years' Work of the United States Supreme
Court, 53 A.B.A. ItxP. 259, 271-72, 278 (1928).
8 Journal of Legal Ed.No.1-2
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Paradoxical as this may seem, the proposal of a broader base for legal
studies as a means of simplification was not altogether a novel one.
Woodrow Wilson, in the early years of his professorship of jurisprudence and political economy at Princeton, thus explained his method
of presenting law as a liberal study: "'
I am careful, in my own lecturing, to treat such subjects as strictly as possible as a part of political science-to exhibit law as an instrument of society

.

.

.

I am punctilious to give out as little as may be of such law

as could be used in court to win a case with. If you say that such studies,
though no doubt very interesting, and even stimulating and enlightening, are
only for the man who has the time for them; that they are a luxury, and are
but so much the more added to what the lawyer will in any case be obliged to
learn, I reply that you are mistaken; that such studies, besides being in themselves a liberal education, really save time. It saves time to become more
than a lawyer, and be a jurist. You have just so much the readier and more
various means of ascertaining and enforcing the methods and the arguments
by which to win cases, if that is all you want; and you will the sooner get chc
best sort of practice. . . . That is what I mean by saving time; saving
subsequent time. The more various the apparatus of study, the easier the

study. And so I believe that, by teaching law to undergraduates thus historically and comparatively, and as a part of general political science, as if
it were stuff of society, with a wealth of instructive experience wrapped up
in it, a material and vehicle of life, I am making, so far as I succeed, not
only enlightened men, but also successful lawyers.
I do not hesitate to say, moreover, that in general view and method professional instruction in law should be of the same kind. Just in proportion
as you give, along with every principle, its history and its rational explanation, just in that proportion do you increase the ease and rapidity with which
the pupil will master it, and the certainty that he will retain and be able to
make accurate use of it.

.

.

.

To do this saves time, I urge again, as

well as makes better, more masterful and sure-footed lawyers.
Leaving aside questions of simplification, there was still less novelty
in the valuation which Stone placed on social studies as an integral part
of the education of the lawyer. Although the Columbia faculty thought
of themselves as innovators, 61 this was essentially a return to the
eighteenth-century conception of the relevance to law of all human
knowledge relating to social affairs. In educational terms, it was a re60 Wilson, Legal Education of Undergraduates,17 A.B.A. REP. 439, 447-49 (1894).

Wilson also referred to the opinion of James Bryce, that "a student who, out of

three years devoted to law study, has given one year to Roman law and two to
English, will, at the end of the period, know as much English law as the man who
has given all three of the years to studying nothing else; and . . . that the
student of Roman law will know English law more discriminatingly and with an
easier mastery." Id. at 448.
61 SUtMARY OF STUDIES 9.
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turn to the principle of the professorships of the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries; to the ideas embodied in the curricula of
Yale and Columbia in the last quarter of the nineteenth century; 62
and to what had been a favorite theme for Mr. Justice Holmes:
An ideal system of law should draw its postulates and its legislative justification from science. As it is now, we rely upon tradition, or vague sentiment, or the fact that we never thought of any other way of doing things,
as our only warrant for rules which we enforce with as much confidence as
if they embodied revealed wisdom. 6 3 For the rational study of the law the
black-letter man may be the man of the present, but the man of the future is
the man of statistics and the master of economics.

.

.

.

I look forward

to a time when the part played by history in the explanation of dogma shall
be very small, and instead of ingenious research we shall spend our energy
on a study of the ends sought to be attained and the reasons for desiring
them. As a step toward that ideal it seems to me that every lawyer ought
to seek an understanding of economics. The present divorce between the
schools of political economy and law seems to me an evidence of how much
progress in philosophical study still remains to be made. 64
Stone's conception of the relevance of nontechnical studies to the training of lawyers differed sharply, however, from that which had dominated
legal education for half a century. According to the dominant view,
a liberal education was desirable for its own sake, as a cultural and humanizing experience; 6' but it had little or nothing to do with the lawyer's professional training. In so far as educational considerations entered at all into the establishment and increase of educational requirements for admission, they were concerned with the maturity and literacy
of the law school population, and with "mental training" in preparation
for technical studies.6 6 Occasionally, they were concerned with equipping the student with a fund of information which would place him on
62 See Part Two, 3 J.LEGAL EDUC. 331, 377 (1951). Since that account was written, additional information on Francis Lieber's connection with the Law School
at Columbia has been made available. See 3 THE D.ARY OF GEORGE TEmPLETOq
STRONG 13, 28; 4 id. xxii, 5-7, 9, 10, 23, 207-208, 235, 427, 441, 464 (Nevins and Thomas ed. 1952).
63 HOLMES, Learning and Science, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 138, 139 (1921).
64 HOLMS, The Pathb of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 187, 195
(1921).
65 See Part Two, 3 J.LEGaL EDUC. 331, 367 et seq. (1951).
66 Ass'N. OF Amx.L.ScHooLs, HANDEOOK 35-37 (1922); Vanderbilt, A Report on
Pre-legal Bdication, 25 N.Y.U.L.IEv. 199, 216 (1950). Even this utility was denied
by some: "If the only purpose of entrance requirements were to prepare students
to wrestle with the complexities of technical law, then-let us be honest about itno fixed amount of preliminary education need be insisted upon. . . . A bright
high school graduate or a zealous self-educated clerk will often play around a college graduate in law school courses organized as they are today." ALFRED Z. REED,
TRAING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFEssIOx oF THE LAw 315-16 (1921). Stone sharply
disagreed with this position, largely because he believed in the relevance to law
study of the subject matter of liberal education. Stone, Book Review, 22 CoLuJ.
L.REv. 284, 290, 291 (1922).
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intimate terms with the subject matter of a variety of cases encountered
in practice; 67 and some law teachers, in more or less facetious mood,
lamented the absence of such a common fund of culture as would permit the conduct of classes on a high plane of allusion and analogy. 8
Legal education, in short, had developed very much as the education of
professional chess-players might be planned. All that is necessary to
a complete mastery of the game is contained within the four corners of
the board. Years spent in learning the rules, the potentialities of the
pieces, the tested stratagems, and in constant practice-years spent, in
fact, in studying historic games in which the basic openings and defenses
were developed by.the masters-will suffice. Of course, no one would
want the professional chess-player to be just that and nothing more;
he should not be deprived of the benefits of a liberal education. He
should have that, and no doubt in the process of acquiring it he may
take some such courses as logic, mathematics, or classical languages
to develop his powers of reasoning and teach him concentratibn; but,
after all, the way to learn chess is to study chess. Cultural studies are
all very admirable, but they have nothing whatever to do with whether
a man is to be a great player or not; consequently, they should be so
placed in the total sequence of his education as not to divert him from
his technical studies during the period assigned to them. 9 Chess is a
jealous mistress.
67 Thus, it has been suggested that anatomy and geology be taught in the law
school-for personal injury and oil and gas specialists. Ass'x op Ali.L.ScHOOLS,

HANDBooK 177, 206 (1939).
68 "There have been moments when the reviewer would have been grateful for

a rule which prescribed at least one subject for law school entrants, even If It were
as remote from law as geology or the differential calculus, for then he could assume one common fund of information from which he could draw Illustrations of
facts and logical methods with confidence that all the class knew what he was talking about. At the present time any allusion to science, literature, or history Is
..
sure to be meaningless to at least half the college graduates in the room .
[T]he use of the relatives of Romeo and Juliet to clarify (supposedly) a complicated
pedigree case led to an overheard conversation between two students: 'Who were
these Montagues and Capulets, anyhow?'" Chafee, Book Review, 41 HAnv.L.REV.
265-66 (1927). The persistence of this theme is phenomenal. See Jacob, Trusts,
Future Interests, and All That: Being Again a Review of Reviews; to Whicl
Are Both Prefixed and Appended Certain Thoughts on the Present Discontents,
18 Co nx-EL.L L.Q. 351 (1933), where it is observed that Kansas law students, although they did not know the number of shillings in a pound, did know the number
of feet in a fathom-a small boon for which grateful acknowledgment Is made to
the students' Sunday school training. Even in 1950, Judge Vanderbilt's first complaint in listing the shortcomings of prelegal 'education was that "no Instructor In
any class in any law school can make a reference to Plato or Aristotle, to the
Bible or Shakespeare, to the Federalist or even the Constitution itself with an:"
real assurdnc that he will be understood." Vanderbilt, A Report on Prelegal Blducation, 25 N.Y.U.L.REv. 199, 200 (1950). Some sort of record in this field was set
by Professor Harry Jones, who regretted the necessity of borrowing his analogies
from baseball and football and yearned for law students able to understand vector
analysis. Jones, Notes on the Teaching of Legal Method, 1 J.LEGAL EDU0. 13, 16
(1948).
69 See Part Two, 3 J.LEGAL EDUC. 331, 376-77 (1951).
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It should be clear enough that the Columbia Law Schools interest in
nonlegal studies was far removed from attitudes such as these. It was
still farther removed from the 'presumptuous complaint that the 'law
schools could provide the cultural and disciplinary elements of a lawyer's
training more effectively than the colleges and hence should assume a
0 The
closer supervision of such aspects of the preliminary education.
fault to be remedied was funda~mental and was the fault of the law
teachers themselves, who had taken too narrow a view of their responsibility and of the meaning of law. The subjects which were being badly
taught were not the social sciences, but the technical courses in the law
schools. The difficulty, Stone Wrote, arose from "our traditional attitude toward law as a body of technical doctrine more or less detached
from those social forces Which if regulates. We have failed to recognize
as clearly as we might that law 'is nothing more than a form of social
control intimately related to those social functions which are the subject
matter of economics and the social sciences generally." 7' New ways of
looking at law Were to be taken seriously in the law school curriculum.
Legal classifications were to be reorganized so that the divisions of the
curriculum would reflect the relationship between law and other branches
of knowledge concerned with similar problems. As the relevance of
these neglected bodies of -knowledge became apparent, they were to be
exploited for every ray of illumination they could shed on the problems
. . 'a material and
.
of the law.: The law was "stuff of society 73
vehicle of life." 7 As such it was to be studied.
70 'Only the joinder of humanistic and technical education in method and content so as to constitute a well-rounded and integrated professional education can
bring this about. The responsibility of preparing professional students for effective citizenship and cultivated living is thus a responsibility of professional eduIf this is
cation that it cannot wholly delegate to general education. . .
true for students of engineering, is it not equally true for other professional students, whether of law, medicine, divinity, or business? And if this is so, should not
undergraduate education for all professional students be so related to professional
education as to attain these values without allowing four college years to elapse
before education takes on the vitality and usefulness that it could have from the
start?" Smith, The Education of Professional Students for Citizenship, in EDUCATIOX. OR PnorEssioA.L REsPoNsiBiLTY 188, 203 (1948), reviewed in 62 HRAv.
L.REv. 1252, 1256 (1949). See also HARvARD UmvERsiTy, REPonT OF TE DEAN
OF THE HAIvARD LAW SCHOOL (Landis) 7-10 (1938-39).

71 Stone, The Future of Legal Education, 10 A.B.A.J. 233, 234 (1924).
72 Wilson, supra note 60.
73 In 1952, the Association of American Law Schools adopted a Statement of
Association Policy on Pre-Legal Education. Ass'N oF Am. L. SCHooLs, HANDnOOK
106, 107, 109 (1952). This excellent document rises far above the motivations
which have stimulated criticism of various aspects of the movement to establish
general educational requirements for admission to law schools. It is concerned
with qualitative rather than quantitive aspects of pre-legal education. It emphasizes education for "a full life" and for "citizenship in the world community" rather
than training for later professional study and practice. It recommends that the
student seek the best teaching'available rather than specific courses. -It lists as one
of the primary objectives of pre-legal education "critical understanding of the
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III
The Columbia faculty, like others who have attacked the problem of
integrating law and the social sciences, had difficulty in reaching that
level of discussion which is concerned with specific course content and
materials. In the beginning, there was a great deal of discussion of law
school objectives " and "methodology" in the broad sense. 5 In addition, the studies ranged over a wide variety of subjects germane to the
general re-evaluation of the curriculum, but not necessarily to the specific problems of functional course organization and integration of non-6
legal materials.. There was a study of the junior college movement,
one of the development of collegiate schools of business, 77 a re-examination of the values of the case method, 78 a study of the development of
the social sciences, 9 and an analysis of existing law school programs."
There was discussion of devices for easing the transition to the new
curriculum, 8 and the structure and content of the new program were
conceived in broad terms.8" But committees were quickly established
to deal concretely with specific divisions of the subject matter; and, sooner than might be supposed, they were coming to grips with specific problems. The list of committees indicates both the general nature of the
functional classification and its incompleteness: Labor (Dowling, Hale);
Finance and Credit (Llewellyn, Moore); Marketing (Oliphant, Llewellyn); Form of Business Unit (Moore, Shanks, Douglas); Risk and
Risk-bearing (Patterson, Smith, Oliphant); Law Administration (Magill, Smith, Medina); Criminal Law (Kidd, Moley); Family and Familial Property (Powell, Moe, Johnson) ; Legislation (Parkinson, Chamberlain, Dowling); and Historical and Comparative Jurisprudence
human institutions and values with which the law deals"; but it makes no demand

that the colleges provide any specific training in subject matters which might be
thought relevant to professional education. Consistently with the ideas developed
at Columbia, any such training is left to the law schools themselves.
74 Documents 2, 3, 10, and 11. At the outset, a difference of opinion which was
to assume significance for the fate of the project became apparent. It concerned the
question whether the school was to become primarily a "research school" or to
remain one primarily for training for professional careers. The issue and Its effect on the program are dealt with more fully below.
75 Documents 14, 15, 18.
76 Document No. 5.
77 Document No. 6.
78 Document No. 16 (using the Redlich report as the point of departure).
79 Document No. 20.
so Document No. 25.
81Document No. 24.
82 Documents 21 and 22. The curriculum was conceived as having three phases,
involving primarily (1) "orientation and tool-getting," (2) "analysis and assimilation," and (3) "synthesis, evaluation, and specialization." The subject matter was
outlined not in terms of courses but of "functional" categories.
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The general studies and those which explored
(Yntema, Goebel)."
collateral matters were to continue, and are replete with statements of
the working educational policy as it was conceived by individuals or
committees. The chief value of the records which have been preserved,
however, lies in the light they throw on the solution of practical problems of course construction and on factors affecting the success or failure
of the reorganization program and its constituent parts. The procedure
to be followed in this review of the records, therefore, will be to consider
the work done in the subject-matter categories in turn (tracing the development, where that is possible, beyond the period of the faculty's organized discussions), with the objectives of determining what measures
were considered desirable and practical, and of gathering clues as to the
reasons for success or failure. Statements of educational policy or of
legal theory will be referred to only incidentally.
1. Business Units. The first committee to report was that on the
form of the business unit. A seminar in the law of business organization
was already being offered; and the report was entitled: "Business Associations: Devices for Organizing for Management, for Limiting Risk,
and for Assembling Capital." ' Since this is one of the functional
classifications which survived to become a familiar component of the
law curriculum, the general nature and purpose of the proposed grouping of materials needs no elaboration. It was designed to treat problems
traditionally covered in Agency, Partnership, Corporations, Mortgages,
and Bankruptcy, and in various courses in the School of Business. The
implications with respect to staff and library suggest, not surprisingly,
that financial problems may be a major obstacle in the way of such comprehensive reorganizations: 8According to the plans already adumbrated, there will be organized a group
of investigators and teachers for work in the field of business and the law
relating thereto. A division of this group should be devoting its attention
to that part of the field of business and law delineated in the accompanying
outline. Continuous work in this division would require the services of a
statistician, an accountant, several specialists in business, and a number in
law . . .. At the disposal of those in this division should be research
...
The
assistants and necessary stenographic and clerical help .

Scudder Library should be built up. . :. .
83 Document No. 4. Four committees were assigned to work not based on classifications of subject matter. Of these, the most significant were concerned with
Methodology (Smith, Oliphant, Llewellyn, Moore, Jervey) and with Intra-University Relations (aervey).
84 Document No. 26. Of. Douglas, A FunotionaZApproaoh to the Law of Bu8iness
A8soclations, 23 ILL.L.REv. 673 (1929).
85 Document No. 26, at 93.
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The committee's original report contains two interesting hints of what
was to come:""
The efforts of such a group should in large part be devoted to businesslaw research projects. Particularly suggested are: the shift of control from
"ownership" to managers; social -incidents of the doctrine of ultra vires; the
isolation of the unit characters of corporate securities; determination of
unit characters of business administration. The study in Judicial Valuation
at present carried on under the direction of Professor Bonbright suggests
what may be done in their field.
The reference to the Bonbright studies was presumably intended only
to indicate the type of joint research that might be undertaken, for, apart
from questions of corporate finance, no other relationship between valuation of -property and the problems of business organization is apparent.
But, since the matter h~s been mentioned in this connection, this is as
good a place as any to note that the monumental volumes which resulted
from the study of valuation 87 provided a brilliant demonstration, by its
fusion of legal and economic analysis, of the potentialities of the kind
of interdisciplinary research which the faculty was proposing to undertake.8 The suggestion that research be done on the shift of control
from ownership to managers was "molded into concrete form" by Professor Edwin F. Gay of Harvard; in 1928, the study was begun, financed
by the Social Science Research Council of America and directed by the
Columbia University Institute for Research in the Social Sciences. In
1932, it resulted in the publication of the well-known work by A. A.
Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporationand Priz'ate
Property.9 The problems of interdisciplinary research were thus de8614. at 93-94.
87 JAMEs C. BO'NBUIGHT, THE VALUATION OF PROPERTY (1937). The work was
done under the auspices of the Columbia University Council for Research In the
Social Sciences. For a list of separate monographs and articles produced by the
stL-dy, see the Preface.
SSFor contemporary reviews, see Peterson, Book Review, 45 J.PoL.EcoN. 828
(1937); Berle, Book Review, 51 HAR'.L.REv. 947 (1938); Nerlove, "Valuation of
Property"--A Review, 6 U.CH.L.RE. 157 (1939), with a reply by Professor Bonbright, id. at 166; Hulme, Book Review, 25 A.B.A.J. 148 (1939); Watson, Book, Review, 15 TAx MAG. 419 (1937); Shenefield, Book Review, 27 NAT'L Muxi.Rnv. 473
(1938).
89 Among the many reviews were those by Ballantine, Book Review, 21 CAILM,
L.REV. 78 (1932); Isaacs, Book Review, 42 YAE I.fJ.
463 (1933); Frank, Book
Review, 42 YALE L.J. 989 (1933); 'Mdyers, Bbok Review, 42 YALE L.J. 997 (1933)1
Wormser, Book Review, 19 A.B.A.3. 113 (1933); and Dodd, Book Review, 81 U.PA.
L.Rnv. 782 (1933) ("This study of the modern corporation is unusual In Its attempt
to fuse the point of view of the lawyer and the economist in a single work. That
the fusion has been largely successful is due to the fact that both Mr. Berle and
Mr. Means think in terms of the corporation as it actually exists today rather than
of what legal or economic tradition has said about it."). The background of the
project is sketched in the Preface. Earlier, Berle had published his Studies in the
Law of Corporation Finance (1928), and in 1934, he published, In collaboration
with Miss Victoria J. Pederson, a book on Liquid Claims and National Wealth.
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scribed by Prof essor Berle: 90'
Difficulty in such cooperation is extreme; for technicians in different fields
must first agree on a common language; then endeavor to apply their respective methods of approach, keeping in mind the shortcomings and advantages of the different methods; and finally work out conclusions to which
both are prepared to subscribe. Since a lawyer is primarily concerned with
the justice of the individual case and 'can never ignore the problem of what
ought to be done; and since an economist is primarily descriptive and analytic, the chasm is not easy to bridge.
In the year following the intensive faculty studies (i.e., in 1927-28),
two new courses in business associations were added, and a third was
planned for the following year. A course designed to "consider the
advantages and disadvantages of different types of business associations
as devices for allocating risk" was given in the first year. Another,
"approaching business associations as finance devices," was offered to
second- and third-year students. In the latter, the use of economic data
was emphasized. The third course, planned but not offered in 1927-28,
was to deal with problems of business management. 9 ' The course in
corporation finance was given in 1928 and 1929 with mimeographed
materials, which were published in 1930.
Although the book was
greeted as being, both in the arrangement and in the selection of materials,
"'a challenge to traditional methods of legal classification," 93 the extent
to which it utilized nonlegal materials was not notable. About 75 per
cent of its bulk was devoted to cases. The "materials" took the form
of introductory notes indicating the business problems involved and
summarizing the technical uses of particular devices,9" of corporate forms,
and of incidental background material.9" In the Preface, the author
mentioned the importance to the student of "some sense of the financial
process in action, fortunately available to him through the newspapers
dealing with current business activity," and recommended Dewing's
FinancialPolicy of Corporationsas collateral reading.
90 A. A. BERLE & GAIDINER C. MrEANs,
PROPERTY V-Vi (1932).

THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE

91 COLumBIA UmvmRsrry, REPORT or TnE DEA,
92 A. A. BERLE, CASES AND

MATERIALS

I

SCHOOL OP LAW 16-17 (1928).

THE LAW OP CORPORATION FNANCE

(1930). A report by Professor Berle on his early experience in giving the course
is in The Memoranda of the Marshall Conferences at 832 (1929).
93 Dodd, Book Review, 44 H.nv.L.REv. 1006 (1931).
94 BERLE, op. cit. supranote 92, at iv (1930).
95 Thirty-nine pages were devoted to a form of corporate trust indenture. BER=.,
op. cit. supra note 92, at 498. The rules of the Committee on Stock List of the New
York Stock Exchange were reprinted. Id. at 700. One reviewer found "intensely
interesting" the financial history of Nash Motors Company, printed at 585, and
welcomed the inclusion (at 793) of a "business precedent" consisting of an analysis
by accountants of the fairness of the terms of a merger agreement. Katz, Book
Review, 40 YALE L.J. 1125,1126, 1127 (1931).
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One thing is clear: the ideal of simplification of the curriculum through
functional reorganization was not being achieved. With substantial
unanimity, the reviewers noted that the old, unitary course on corporations must now become three courses-as, indeed, it had become at
Columbia." Functionalism had split the study of corporations into three
phases-risk, finance, and management-and enough legal and nonlegal
materials had been found to stretch it throughout the three years of the
curriculum.

97

A tentative "source book" for the course on business organization,
prepared by Professor Magill, was first printed in 1930-31 " and was
followed by the publication, in 1933 and 1935, of Magill and Hamilton's
Cases on Business Organization. The original division of the law of
business units into the three phases-risk, management, and financewas abandoned. Corporation finance was temporarily established as a
separate course, but risk and management problems were to be combined
in the course on business organization. Experience with the effort to
maintain the division between risk (or losses) and management had been
"not altogether satisfactory." 9 The course covered materials (other
than those dealing with corporation finance) ordinarily contained in the
courses on agency, partnership, and corporations, and, in addition, ma96Dodd, Book Review, 44 HAIv.L.REv. 1006, 1007 (1931); Douglas, Book Review, 17 VA.L.REv. 625 (1931); Katz, Book Review, 40 YALE LJ. 1125, 1127 (1931).
97 Twelve years later, a revised edition of the casebook was published by Professor Roswell Magill. A. A. BERLE & ROSWELL MAGILL, OASES & MATERIALS IN
THE LAW OF CORPORATION FNANcE (1942). The plan of organization had been substantially modified by the development of the course in business organization, and
by the passage of the Federal Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. There was a distinct diminution of the nonlegal content; while many
of Berle's textual notes were retained, a practicing reviewer complained of the
omission of those on the investment banking operation and the processes of corporate promotion. Zlinkoff, Book Review, 42 COLu.L.REV. 1380, 1382 (1942).
And, ironically, the same reviewer regretted the relinquishment of certain portions
of the earlier edition to the course on business organizations, noting that they were
"basically interrelated" with the subject of corporation finance, notwithstanding
any "artificial division within the law school courses." Id. at 1381.
98 COLUmBIA UmvEnsrm , REPORT OF THE DEAN, SCHOOL OF LAw 17 (1931).
991 ROSWELL MAGILL & R. P. HAMILTON, CASES ON BUSINESS ORGANIZATION iV
(1933). At Yale, however, the original functional classification was being fully Implemented. See the Preface to W. 0. DOUGLAS & C. M. SuAms, CASES AND MATERiALS ON THE LAW OF MANAGEMENT OF Busn~ss UNITS (1931), where the origin
of the general idea is attributed to Underhill Moore. The treatment of nonlegal
materials is indicated in the Preface to the casebook cited: "In view of the fact
that the realignment of materials made herein suggests new considerations and
raises new problems not finding ready answer in statutes or decisions, much nonlegal material has been cited. Limitations of space forbade extensive use of such
material, but enough has been cited to supply some information on those points
about which economists, sociologists and accountants, as well as lawyers and
judges, have been concerned. In some instances where the problem demanded It
the non-legal material has been brought to the fore. An example is the treatment of
the dividend questions in Oh. III (8) avowedly for what they are-accounting
problems-accompanied by an exposition of elementary accounting concepts." P. IV.
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terials on business trusts, limited partnerships, and joint stock associations, the primary objective being to "bring realistically before the student the relative advantages and disadvantages of the various forms of
business association." 10o If use was made of nonlegal materials, they
elude the scrutiny which can be given to the book for purposes of this
paper by one who is not a specialist in the field; 101 nor was the use of such
materials remarked by the principal reviewers.10
In 1948, Professors Berle and Warren published their Cases and
Materials on the Law of Business Organizations (Corporations). This
event marked the demise not only of the "functional" combination of
corporations with other devices for business organization, but also of
the separate course in corporation finance-and so, finally, of the triumvirate of risk, management, and finance. In their Foreword, the authors
said:
Twenty years ago the Columbia Law School concluded that the study of
corporation law had been too severely limited by tradition. It undertook to
augment the classic corporations course by adding a new course called "Corporation Finance." In course of time this arrangement was widely accepted
in many law schools. As it gained recognition, corporation finance established itself as a branch of coordinate standing with the conventional course
in corporations.
Yet, from the beginning it was clear that there was no real line between
the principles of corporation law and the principles applicable to those financial situations which are conventionally a part of the life-experience of most
corporations. In time the courses could and should be integrated.
This collection of materials is an endeavor to accomplish that integration.
Here was integration with a new twist: the joining together of that
which had been put asunder for the sake of integration of law and other
social disciplines. On the surface, at least, the Columbia Law School
had come full circle. Prior to 1927-28, it had offered a course in corporations; now it offered one in corporations-in parentheses.
It would be naive, however, to assume lightly that these two decades of
experiment were without significant effect on the teaching of corporation
100 1d. at iii.
101Except for quotations from Woodrow Wilson's The New Freedom, Berle &
Means' The Modern Corporationand Private Property, and Dewing's The Financial
Policy of Corporations.
102 Steffen, Book Review, 82 U.PA.L.REv. 190 (1933); Frey, Book Review, 83
IU.PA.L.REv. 1037 (1935). Steffen vigorously questioned the classification which
lumped agency, partnership, and corporations togther: "The trouble seems to have
come from an ill considered and somewhat hasty adoption of the business school
categories of Management, Risk, and Finance as sufficient guides for the redistribution of the entire mass of legal materials. The difference between the business
school objective-more and bigger profits-and that of the leading law schools
should perhaps have warned against too prompt adoption."
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law. Even to orie having no particular familiarity with the sfilbject, it is
apparent that the course in corporations had come a long way; 103 but the
differences were not manifested in any very tangible way in terms of
either "functional approach" or nonlegal materials. The importance of
the corporation as a social institution was stressed in the Foreword;
but, as one reviewer remarked, the book did not attempt to treat the larger
questions: the social and sociological implications of the modern corporation were left to be developed by the individual teacher according to
his own ideas and concepts.'0 Notes were included "relevant to the
sociological as well as to the financial and property aspects of the corporate problem," 105 and a tentative effort was made to acquaint the
student with some fundamentals of accounting.'
Thus, some of Berle's
earlier use of nonlegal materials was preserved, although perhaps with
less emphasis and more modesty: the objective was to supply business
background rather than social science.' 0 The chief difference between
this book and its "classical" predecessors consisted in its more faithful
reflection of the problems actually encountered in modern corporate practice, its sensitiveness to social implications, and its receptiveness to enlightenment from sources outside the formal materials of the law.
2. The Family and FamilialProperty. On February 22, 1925, Professor Herman Oliphant submitted a. "Memorandum concerning a Proposed Study of Familial Law"; he resubmitted it on November 16,
1926, when the faculty had organized for its re-examination of the curriculum. 0 s
All rules of law [he said], both statutory and customary, should be judged
by legislators and courts by their effects upon the human relations which
they regulate or promote, and should be approved or changed accordingly.
It is not enough to consider them merely as ideas; how, as such, they came
about; and how they fit into some body of abstract doctrine. In order to
judge rules of law by their effect it is necessary:
1. To discover what human relation is actually being affected by the
operation of a given rule of law and
103 See Latty, Book Review, 1 J.LEGAL EDUC. 622 (1949).
104 Zlinkoff, Book Review, 8 LAw.GuiLD REv. 428 (1948).
105 A. A. BERLE & W. C. WARREN, CASES ANlD MATERIALS O N TIE LAv OF BuSI-

iESS ORGANIZATIOx (CoRpoRATIoNs) viii (1948).
106 Id. at 192.
107 Zlinkoff, supra note 104, spoke too strongly when he criticized the editors for
41
omit[ting] the collection of law review and nonlegal material which has In recent
years so often made casebooks such a valuable tool to the practitioner." A good
example of the background note appears at p. 922 of the casebook. A more accurate appraisal of the textual material is given by Hornstein, Book Review, 48
COLu.L.REv. 815 (1948).
See also Field, Book Review, 62 HAzv.L.REv. 160

(1948).
1 108 Document No. 28.
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2. To marshal the contemporary data of the other social sciences concerning that human relation and consciously to weigh such data in passing upon

the rule in question. 109

Taking family relations as a case in point, he proposed no
a study of the whole of our law aimed at attaining two objectives:
1. 'The primary object is to uncover those areas of the law now affe6ting
the family without our being aware of the fact and to reclassify this material
in a way more significant for a study of these rules of law as social forces
actually shaping human relations and conduct. Present classification tends
merely to facilitate the study of these rules of law as concepts, as parts of
the history of legal thought or as parts of a body of abstract doctrine.
. 2. The secondary objective is tp disclose to students of law
the major
bodies of pertinent knowledge as t6 the family in the other social sciences
and to consider methods of using such knowledge in judging rules of law.
For illustrative purposes the study will include a detailed examination of one
or more rules of law in this manner.
The report of the committee on° the family and familial property began with a discussion of the reasons for the committee's existence and
with problems of definition.'
It then undertook a brief surve r of the
nonlegal literature on the family, indicating that its members had canvassed and classified a remarkably large body of sociological, anthropological, historical, and economic material-without, so far as appears,
the aid of experts in those fields. ' It found that only a very few lawtrained persons had worked on the production of such materials, and that
the interaction between law and the family had been considered only in
connection with marriage." 2 It found, for that matter, that little was
known about the nature and organization of the modern family. 1 3 The
committee, therefore, concluded that "the approach to familial law is at
least two or three decades behind the present state of wisdom as to business law, and that the painful efforts of the pioneers in that field during
the past thirty years must be duplicated in the field of familial law before a report on this topic can approximate the definiteness and excellence now obtainable in the fields of business organization and market109 Id. at 125B.
110 Id. at 1250.

IlDocument No. 42.
U12 Id. at 320.
113 Ibid. The report quoted the following passage from

ERmsT RI. MlOwnEn'S

Family Disorganization: "Our ignorance of the life of the present-day family is

none the less colossal because of the vast and increasing literature upon sex and

marriage and the family. For much of this literature deals with family life of
other societies than our own, the best of it with marriage and the family among
preliterate peoples, and the remainder of it with the large patriarchal family, the
type of familial organization of the ancient Israelites, Romans and Greeks
0 . . . Foreword viii (1st ed. 1927).
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ing." n4 It, nevertheless, proposed a program based upon the assumption
"that familial organization and law have interacted and are now interacting with resultant modifications of each." 115 Its first concern was
with the organization of law materials into a course-classification which
would "center the student's attention upon an inquiry as to the social
tendency of the law in question when such law impinges on the family
• ,,;n
the second was with extensive research, which was held
vital to the ultimate success of the proposed reorganization of the curriculum.
In planning an outline for the curricular offering, the committee rejected an approach based upon the various functions-biological, educational, economic, and political-supposed to be served by the family,
and adopted instead the following plan: 117
If, however, the body of law now functioning be examined and the parts
thereof are selected out (1) which look as if they are attributable in part or
in whole to familial factors, or (2) which seem likely to account for existing
phenomena in the familial organization, or (3) which help to define the existing familial organization, and the material thus selected is arranged, for
teaching, in an organization which brings vividly to the attention of the
student variations in the generalized type fact situation and seeks to arouse
an inquiry as to the fact, degree and significance of this interaction, it is believed that a step forward will have been made.
. .
The course plan thus suggested was frankly a transitional effort; its
hypotheses were to be continually tested by the concurrent research. A
questionnaire was submitted to the faculty, seeking out every phase of
the law which might bear upon the family,"' and a detailed course outline was constructed."
The range of this outline, owing to the diversity of the laws which
may affect the family, was formidable, and in one respect caused the committee-and its chairman, Professor Richard R. Powell-some concern.
Substantial parts of what had been "Real Property" were so far included
as to receive adequate treatment, but many phases of land law and its
special techniques were left out. At this stage, however, that circumstance did not lead the committee to the old doubts about duplication
and loss of doctrinal training which the first functional courses had aroused among their critics; the committee's faith in the efficacy of total functionalization was strong: "In the judgment of this committee, this merely
114 Document
115 Id. at 321.
116 Ibid.
117 Id. at 322.

No. 42 at 320.

(Italics in the original.)
118 Document No. 28.
119 Document No. 42, at 328.
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means that other foci or typical fact situations must be thought out,
about which these other essential materials may be grouped." 120 A note
of caution was sounded, however, against carrying too far the functional
grouping of all laws that may bear, even significantly, on the family.
Thus, the course might include a study of permissible testamentary dispositions by the creation of trusts and future interests, on the theory
that the relation between the family and the law of testamentary disposition would be accordingly illuminated. "It is certain, however, that
[if this were done] we would be dealing with material which today is
quite as significant in instruments unrelated to familial problems as in
instruments affecting these relationships. It would be strained, if not
impossible, to relate these techniques, so important in present law, to
familial factors. The body of law thus sought to be annexed is so bulky
quantitatively that our resultant structure would justify an assertion that
the tail is wagging the dog." 121
Thus, the scheme of functional classification of the law was found to
have difficulties of its own, fundamental enough, as it turned out, to
amount to real trouble for the reorganization program as a whole. In
addition, the committee was confronted with formidable problems of
finance, personnel, and execution in connection with the research program
which was to be an indispensable supplement to the course. It dealt
only briefly with those problems, and its air was one of confidence. But
it noted that the work to be done would require "the cooperative efforts
of social historians, sociologists, economists, statisticians, and lawyers,
or

.

.

.

persons who combine sufficient equipment in several of

these fields"; 122 and it was aware that the task involved not merely the
assimilation of existing knowledge in the areas of social science, but the
discovery of knowledge about the modern family. Finally, this committee likewise saw the goal of simplification receding: "More time
would be needed to teach the outlined material than is now devoted to
the parts thereof distributed about in our present curriculum." 123 This
meant not only that the course in domestic relations would be enlarged,
but also that, since only minor segments would be taken out of other
courses, there would be no compensating reduction in other offerings,
such as the course in business organizations, with its envelopment of
Agency, Partnership, and Corporations, was originally intended to
achieve. Still the committee was sanguine. "This," it said, "is to be
expected and is one of the liabilities incident to the acquisition of new
assets. It is believed that time will prove the bargain a good one." 124
IN Ibid.
1211J. at 329.
122 Id.
123

at 330.

Ibid.

IN ibid.

HeinOnline -- 8 J. Legal Educ. 31 1955-1956

JOURNAL OF LEGAL EDUCATION

[Vol. 8

In at least some respects, the committee's confidence that the necessary
research could go forward was quickly vindicated. The family was
chosen as a case "typical of the need of correlated study," and as one
which promised fruitful results when so studied. A research proposal
was drafted, and a grant of $25,000 was obtained from the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial Foundation to support the project for one
year. A staff was organized under the direction of Professor Albert
C. Jacobs, with two legal assistants, and Professor Robert C. Angell,
of the Sociology Department of the University of Michigan, with one
assistant in sociology. 5 A distinguished advisory committee of experts in lav and sociology was set up for purposes of criticism and suggestion.' 6 Having begun "its work in September, 1928, the staff subnitted a progress report on April 2, 1929,11 and a comprehensive report
was published in 1930."8 As a basis for research, and especially for
drawing together the diverse laws affecting family relationships, the staff
followed a suggestion contained in the committee report and constructed
a "fact situation outline." "' For purposes of teaching, a quite different
outline was developed after considerable wrestling with problems of
classification. Having considered and rejected several possibilities, including the one employed in the progress report and one suggested by
Professor Oliphant, the staff finally settled upon a plan of organization
which it regarded as a compromise which was "by no means entirely
satisfactory." 130 At this point, the goal of simplification was receding
even more rapidly, for each of the five main headings of the curricular
outline was referred to as a course-although two of them were thought
suitable for seminar treatment, and one might be made into a book for
125 See generally Document No. 55 (A Type-Case Request for Resources-Memorandum concerning a Proposed Probing Study of Family Law); COLumBrA UmVERSITY, IEPORT Ov THE DEAN, SCHOOL OF LAW 20-21 (1928); ALBERT 0. JACOBS
& ROBERT C. ANGELL, A RESEARCH fnl FAmmy LA,%V 3 et seq. (1930). Additional

material bearing on the family appears in the Memoranda of the Marshall Conferences at 923 (Remarks on Method and Value of Socio-legal Research) and 925
(Seminar in Family Law).
126 JACOBS & ANGELL, op. cit. supra note 125, at 7-8.
327 MEMORANDA OF T

MARSHALL CONFERENCES 927 (1929).

128 ALBERT C. JACOBS & ROBERT C. ANGELL, A RESEARCH iN FLmy LA w (1030).
29 Id. at 10, 40. The main headings were:

I. Single Individuals with Reference to Possible Future Family Founding
II. Non-Marriage Families
I1. At Marriage
IV. The Husband and Wife in the Organized Family
V. The Child in the Organjzed Family
VI. The Organized Family as a Whole
VII. Family Disorganization.
130 Id. at 19, 20. See also id. at 275. The main headings (id. at 21) were:
I. Family Organization and Disorganization
II. The Biological Relations of the Family
III. Personality Development and Family Solidarity
IV. The Economic Relations of the Family
V. The Family and Other Institutions.

HeinOnline -- 8 J. Legal Educ. 32 1955-1956

1955]

T9m MATmuLs OF LAW STDm

collateral reading.'n Not surprisingly, in view of the committee's report in 1927, the most intractable problem was the disposal of the law
of property. "This, we must admit," said the final report, "has been the
most discouraging part of our investigation. It is our belief that with
the knowledge and tools available, to attempt to treat a great part of
the field of property law on a functional basis, would not be very fruitful." 132 The temporary solution was to abandon the treatment of those
areas of property law which interact with other institutions as well as
the family, while retaining those which are peculiarly family law and
which could be treated functionally; even so, this left in the plan much
of the law of future interests and of wills, on the theory that, .though it
could not be treated functionally, it clearly affected and was affected by
the family institution.n 3
The final report included a bibliography on the family containing 940
entries, of which 413 represented nonlegal materials; in addition, there
was a bibliography of materials in English and Russian on the contemporary Russian family. 34 Finally, the staff had undertaken, as a pilot
project in socio-legal research, a study of the relationship between husband and wife with reference to the wife's services and earnings within
and outside the home. The results of that study (which, on the sociological side, was conducted by means of interviews and questionnaires)
,were included in the report,lrs together with a frank and critical assessment of its defects and the difficulties encountered in its executi6n.I 36
131 Id. at 21-27. The course in family law which was inaugurated in 1929-30
was based on only the first of the five divisions: Family Organization and Disorganization. Id. at 28.
132 Id. at 25.
133 Ibid.
134 Id. at 651, 654, 734. In view of the scope of the task undertaken, It would
not be surprising if questions should arise concerning the extent to which it was
possible to make critical judgments concerning the nonlegal material that was
assembled. Professor Jacobs was impressed with the work of Westermarck, whose
History of Human Marriage is characterized in the first and second editions of the
subsequent casebook as "one of the monumental works dealing with the development of marriage in its various forms." ALBERT C. JACOBs, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON DomzsTic ]RELATIONS XX (1933); id. at xxii (1939). The casebook contained
no reference to Briffault, whose work, The Mothers (1927), has been regarded as a
"valid and devastating" criticism of Westermarck's thesis. Calverton, Modern
Anthropology and the Theory of CulturaZ Compulsives, in THE MA XIG OF MAN 8,
9 et seq. (Calverton ed. 1931). See also Cairns, Robert Briffault and the Rehabilitation of the MatriarclalTheory, in ANf INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF SOCIOLOGY
668 (Barnes ed. 1948). Briffault's work had been listed in the comprehensive bibliography prepared by the research staff, with the comment: "A study of the origins
of sentiments and institutions." This was the subtitle of The Mothers. JAcoBs &
ANGELL, op. cit. supra note 128, at 671 (1930). In the third edition of the case book
(JACOBS & GOEBEL, 1952), The History of Human Marriage is dropped from the bibliography, and The Mothers is included. See generally GEORGE P. MunDocx, Socts.T,
STRUCTURE c. 8 (1949).
135 JACOBS & ANGELL, op. cit. supra note 128, at 468.
130 Id. at 646.
8 Journal of Legal Ed.No.1-3
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In'their general conclusions on the year's work, Jacobs and Angell reaffirmed their faith in the efficacy of the sociological approach to both
legal research and teaching. Their judgment as to the utility of the
functional classification of law, however, was qualified. For research
purposes, the classification was considered fundamentally sound. The
problem of controlling its tendency to get out of hand, as in the case
of property law, was one to be solved not by abandoning the classification principle but by limiting the range of rules to be considered as
family law. For teaching purposes, however, the functional classification must be modified substantially: "'
Law schools have two main functions: (i) the teaching of law, and (ii)
legal research. These are as distinct as the teaching of geography and exploration. In the one case, students are stimulated to achieve as much proficiency in the use of legal tools and as much understanding of the current
rules of law as a part of the larger social whole as possible. This requires
close organization and economy of time in the presentation of the material.
Legal research, on the other hand, requires the exhaustive study of some
particular aspect of the law and may require the cooperation of other scientists in the quest. .
It may very well be that the [functional] approach will be useful as far as the research aspect of a law school is concerned
and yet not so useful from the angle of teaching. Law parallels life.
. The result is that one can expect no easy form of classification.
If our research is aiming to discover the effectiveness of law in meeting
needs, it must organize about social units-these will in general be institutions. Hence the family is a proper field for research of this character.
However, it must be realized that our law is abstracted from life and therefore that many laws are established to meet needs in all sorts of situationscontracts, for instance. Hence a classification by institutions will never
suffice. The individual as such, apart from all institutions, is sometimes an
object of law. Also, inter-institutional relations are subject to law. .
In other words, the complexity of life must be matched by a complexity of
fields of social research.
While the final judgment as to the appropriateness of these methods was
left to experience, the conviction was clearly growing that patterns appropriate to research were not suitable to teaching, and that the results of
research, if they were to be assimilated into the curriculum, would have
to be adapted to something like the existing structure of legal ideas; for
that structure had, after all, advantages of its own, not the least of which
were pedagogical. Nevertheless, the objective of vitalizing the teaching
of law through a sociological approach based on the results of functional
research was strongly reaffirmed: "[T]he more the law is taught as
evolving out of life situations the more vital it will be to the student." 138
137 Id.
138 _rd.

at 38-39.
at 39.
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Geography cannot be taught by the methods of the explorer; -but where
would it be without them?
The resulting coursebook was published in 1933.'3 The plan of organization was a chronological arrangement of some of the elements
which had been included in the research staff's curricular outline.1 40
There was a bibliography containing thirty-eight nonlegal entries. The
cases were liberally interlarded with sociological materials, and the editor
regretted that more could not be included.' 41 The investigation of attitudes and practices concerning the earnings and services of married
women found a place in an extended footnote and in four pages of the
42
text.'
Although this was the boldest product, so far, of the effort to reorganize the law curriculum and bring the social sciences to bear on it, only
five reviews appeared in legal periodicals, two of which were quite superficial.' 4 3 One of the remaining three was by Professor Angell, who,
of course, was biased, and who spoke as a sociologist and not as one
concerned with teaching law in a professional school. His chief reaction
was one of regret that Professor Jacobs had been led by the facts of
law school life to "steer a middle course between tradition and radical
innovation";' 4 more, not less, emphasis should have been given to
sociological arrangement and materials. In similar vein, Professor
Donald Slesinger of the University of Chicago Law School was sharply
critical: 14'
The major divisions and subdivisions of the book give it a specious sociological framework. On close examination they turn out to be merely new
names and not new classifications.

.

.

The non-legal material, main-

.

ly sociological, is uneven, and badly co-ordinated with the cases. Much of
what is presented is common-sense and historical interpretation with rela.
A statement of sociological conclusions,
tively few concrete data.
without the data on which they are based

.

.

is likely to make the

tough minded legal student a little contemptuous of the tender minded so139 AIBERT C. JACOBS,

CASES AND MATERIALS ON DOiESTIC RELATIONS (1933).

140 Note 129 supra. The main headings in the book were:

I. Family Organization
IL Relations among the Members of an Organized Family
III. Family Disorganization.
141 JAcoBs, op. cit. supra note 139, at vii.
142 id. at 686, 694. The length and complexity of the footnotes produced some
outlandish typography, as at 189-191.
143 Book Review, 11 CEI.-KENT L.REv. 319 (1933); Moreland, Book Review, 22
KY.L.J. 460 (1934).
144 Angell, Book Review, 33 CoLTh..L.REv. 1086, 1088 (1933).
145 Slesinger, Book Review, 1 U.Cm.L.REv. 659-660 (1934). Professor Slesinger
had been co-author, with Robert M. Hutchins, of a series of articles attempting
(without, in Hutchins' judgment, significant results) to apply modem psychology
to the evaluation of rules of evidence. See note 290 infra.
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ciologist . . . [This] is just another compilation making a bow toward the demand for co-ordination, but achieving none of it.

Another law teacher, the author of a comprehensive reference work on
family law, wrote a perfunctory comment, quite oblivious to the book's
objectives and to the serious thought that had gone into the solution of
its problems. Pursuant, no doubt, to the dictates of current fashion,
he professed adherence to a verbal formula: "That the law of domestic
relations must be taught in the light of its economic and sociological
background seems hardly debatable." '" Yet, in the same breath, he
added: "In view of the practical fact that very few classroom hours can
be devoted to discussion of this non-legal material it would seem that
it would be sufficient to cite and summarize, instead of quoting in extenso." 147 Professor Jacobs must have found this rather discouraging.
The conventional law teacher's original response to the demand for integration of law and the social sciences had been to approve the idea in
principle and to take shelter in its unworkability: what nonlegal materials are to be included, who will find them, and how will they be
made available? After Professor Jacobs and his colleagues, with prodigious effort and at great expense, had provided an answer of sorts
to such questions in one field, the response from the same type of teacher
was, not that the wrong materials were provided; not that they were
not enlightening; but that they should merely be cited, and not put right
between the covers of a coursebook, where they would demand attention from students and instructors. Plainly, an obstacle to the progress
of the movement consisted in the fact that law teachers simply did not
want to be bothered.'
The second edition, published in 1939, was little different in outward
appearances. The Preface was substantially the same as that to the
first edition, with the addition of short passages commenting on modifications. The same subject matter was covered, although the chronological
arrangement was abandoned.' 49 The bibliography of nonlegal materials
146 Vernier, Book Review, 47 HARv.L.REv. 732, 733 (1934).
147 Ibid.

148 The same reviewer missed the whole point of the functional classification by
complaining that elimination of some of the nonlegal material would have permitted inclusion of legal material on the contracts of infants-a standard element
of the traditional course on persons and domestic relations,, but one having, In the
judgment
of the editor, nothing to do with the problems of the family. Ibid.
I 149 ALBERT
C. JACOBS, CASES AND MATERIALs ON DOESTXPo RELATIONS (2d ed.
1939). The principal parts now were:
I. Family Organization
II. Family Disorganization
III. Husband and Wife
IV. Parent and Child.
The materials on "solidarity" and economic relations were distributed under

parts III and IV.
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was expanded to include forty-three entries. The treatment of confidential communications was relinquished to the course on evidence.
The emphasis on nonlegal materials was quietly diminished: gone was
the introductory chapter devoted exclusively to social background; the
study of the wife's earnings and services was given only half a dozen
lines in a note.'5 0 Apart from one unsigned and entirely routine notice,
there were five reviews. Two were by newcomers to teaching, both of
whom received the book approvingly, one with perception 1 and one
with no apparent appreciation of its significance. 152 Two more experienced teachers also approved, one' 5 3 taking the unorthodox features
almost for granted, and the other, who has a penchant of his own for
sociology, regretting with the editor the impracticability of including
more nonlegal material, though he thought that, with normal methods,
it was impossible to cover the book as it was in the time available.
The fifth reviewer, a practicing lawyer, sought to reassure his readers
with the comforting intelligence that the sociological emphasis was but 55a
horrid mask, underneath which they would find pretty familiar stuff.'
In 1952, a third edition was published, with Professor Goebel as coeditor. The basic organization was unchanged. The bibliography of
nonlegal materials was enlarged to include fifty-four entries, and was
considerably modernized. Nonlegal materials were still used, but their
presence was not very evident, and nothing was said of them in the
Foreword except that some selections from recent sociological writing
had been added."" The reaction of the law teachers who reviewed this
edition was startling.5 7 Dean Kingsley discussed the problems of
bringing social science materials into law school courses,'53 but that was
because he was reviewing, at the same time, a new book by Professor
Fowler Harper '9 in which the social sciences (and sex as well) were
rediscovered and placed prominently on display. Concluding that such
15 Id. at 694. A humorless reviewer had begrudged the space given in the first
edition (p. 366) to Lord Neaves's verse on Gretna Green marriages. Vernier, Book
Review, 47 HnAv.L.REv. 732, 733 (1934). In response to other pressures (one

hopes), the second edition devoted to the verse only the space required for citation
(p. 107).
151 Willard, Book Review, 27 CA=.L.REv. 631 (1939).
152 Schopflocher, Book Revidw, 40 CoLum.L.REv. 1126 (1940).
153 Jones, Book Review, 34 ILL.L.REv. 377 (1939).
154 Bradway, Book Review, 28 GEo.L.J. 441 (1939).
155 Boyd, Book Review, 26 VA.L.REv. 238, 239 (1939).
D OTHER MATERIALS ON
156 ALBERT 0. JACOBS & J'Lius GOEBEL, CASES
MESTIC RELATIONS x (3d ed. 1952). Exactly the same treatment was given to

Dothe

study of the wife's earnings and services as in the second edition (p. 708); even the

citation to Lord Neaves's verse was dropped (p. 108).

157 There was one review by a practicing lawyer, who was fashionably, if somewhat uncritically, commendatory with respect to the nonlegal content. Pilpel,
Book Review, 53 COLum.L.REv. 448 (1953).
158 Kingsley, Book Review, 5 J.LEGAL EDc. 400 (1953).
19 FOWLER HARPER PROBLEMS OF TnE FA.mm y (1952).
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materials were not adapted to the teaching methods of "conservatives"
like himself, he affirmed his confidence in Jacobs and Goebel-that
"reasonably traditional law book." 160 And Professor Paul Sayre 11
complained that the treatment of family relations was too detached
from life, suggesting that the editors appeared to think of the law of
domestic relations as "a purely verbalistic and logical system of rules
put together under (preferably) Aristotelian influence." 162
3. Property. In the Columbia faculty's organization for attack on
the problems of the curriculum, no provision was made for a committee
on property. The assumption, presumably, was that, when the process
of organizing law studies around significant "type-fact situations" had
been completed, the elements of property law would find their appropriate
places.0 ' The staff for research on family law, however, early announced
its conviction that "to attempt to treat a great part of the field of property law on a functional basis, would not be very fruitful." 164 Indeed,
one member of the committee on the family had already submitted a
memorandum in which the difficulties of classification had been made to
Noting that, after the distribution of substanappear in some detail.'
tial parts of property law to the courses on the family and on security,
much of the field would remain unaffected, he explored the possibilities
for disposition of the remainder. As a further functional classification
-or, at least, a classification which would facilitate the integration of
real property law with the study of economic and social phenomena relating to land-he proposed a course in land utilization. Still, a residuum
comprising "a large body" of the property law in the existing curriculum
would remain to be disposed of.

"This is due

.

. to the fact

that the problem of teaching real property law is one primarily of a professional method or technique which cuts across the facts of land utilization. Whether a man buys land for a house, factory, or farm, the conveyance will be the same.

.

.

.

If this is true, we must frankly

recognize the need for certain technical courses in real property which
will give to the student some knowledge of the peculiarities of English real property law. All we can hope to do with such courses is to
make them as realistic as possible, to give them a content and approach
Kingsley, Book Review, 5 J.LEGAx. EDuC. 400, 401-402.
161 Sayre, Book Review, 5 J.LEGAL EDUC. 399, 400 (1953).

160

162 The Columbia research staff had recommended a study of divorce law in
action. JAcoBs & AxGEI.L, op. cit. supra note 128, at 35 (1930). It is reasonable
to assume that Llewellyn's articles, Behind the Law of Divorce, 32 CoLUM.L.RIiEV.
1281 (1932), and 33 id. 249 (1933), as well as the work of Marshall and May at
Johns Hopkins (The Divorce Court: Maryland (1932); Ohio 1933)), grew out of
the general discussions at Columbia.
363 See note 120 .supra; SUMMAXY OF STUDIES 125-27.
164 Note 132 supra.
165 Johnson, Some Suggestions as to the Place of Real Property Law in the Revised ( urriculum, Document No. 72.
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them from other than a purely legalistic point of view and refuse to let
them be set up as an end in themselves." 166 No less than three such
courses would be required: Interests in Land, Conveyancing (or Vendor
and Purchaser), and Future Interests,' 67 and, in addition, some historical matter ought to be included in an introductory course.
This attack on the problem appears not to have been coordinated with
some plans that were being made by Professor Powell, although perhaps
the two were not wholly inconsistent. Teaching Future Interests with
his own conventional casebook, Professor Powell had "learned some
Trust law"; he also "had some slight knowledge as to Wills"; and he
found himself "edging over into these twilight zones." 16 He began to
think of the relationship between these three fields of law and the process
of wealth distribution, of the social phenomena and policies involved, and
of a course which would draw all of these together. Such a course, if
not functionally organized in the sense of the grouping of materials
around a "type-fact situation," would at least be so in the sense of focusing on a "cluster-spot" and would encourage the study of law in the context of realistic social considerations. Such a course was inaugurated
in the spring of 1928 (though it was modestly called only Future Interests and Non-commercial Trusts), and Professor Powell found himself
confronted with a task of "immediate and appalling urgency"-exploration of the relevant nonlegal data. In a careful and soul-searching
memorandum,6 9 he reported to the faculty his progress during the ensuing two years. The paragraph that follows extracts from that memorandum some of the portions most relevant to the present inquiry, paraphrasing Professsor Powell's language:
In 1928, an assistant, Mr. Charles Looker, assembled a bibliography
of nonlegal materials consisting of about 100 books and pamphlets. It
was thus possible to include in the materials which were being prepared
for the part of the course dealing with trusts an introductory chapter
of fifteen pages and very occasional sidelights on the problems subsequently treated; but by the end of the year 1928-29, little or nothing had
been done on the problem of correlating the nonlegal material nor on
the problem of welding into an integrated, coherent whole the materials
of Future Interests, Wills, and Trusts. In 1929-30, the search for the
nonlegal material was pressed with one full-time and two part-time assistants. No one knew just what was wanted nor where to find it. The
166 Id. at 633.
167 "Because of the complexity of this subject, nothing will be gained by attempting to split it up." Id. at 634.
168 Powell, The ldeaZ for a Course in Weal Distribution,in INMEMORANDA OF THE
See also his statement to the Association,
XARSRALL CONFERENCES 686, 688 (1929).
ASWN OF Am.L.SCHOOLS, HAnDBOOK 34, 38-39 (1928).
169 Supra note 168.
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objective could only be to discover what was in existence, outside cases
and statutes, that seemed relevant to the objectives of the course. An
examination of the literature concerning trust companies yielded some
twenty-five promising volumes,'-70 but the publications by trust companies,
with the exception of the Trust Company Magazine, proved of little
value. It was found useful to have an assistant attend the courses offered
by the American Institute of Banking, for light on the transaction of
trust business. In these ways, and through consultation with a trust
officer, helpful information was obtained about the behavior of trust
companies. This, however, was only one phase of the problem; another was to find out more about the problems arising in actual life
and to bring the course into closer relation to them. Two assistants were
assigned to gather data as to (1) the distribution of wealth; (2) the
percentage of dying persons who leave assets administered in probate
courts; (3) the prevalence of testate disposition; (4) the extent to
which wills are declared invalid; (5) the types of assets constituting
estate; and (6) the shrinkage in estates between the death of the owner
and the final distribution. The researches, confined to the Surrogates'
Courts in New York, Kings, and Bronx counties, resulted in the publica7
tion of a law-review article which has since become well known. 2 1
Further research was done on current practices in testamentary disposition, on the possibilities of corporate organization in estate management, and on accounting practices affecting the relative interests of life
tenants or beneficiaries and holders of subsequent interests.
In a supplemental memorandum, Professor Elliott E. Cheatham, who
had participated in the course in 1929-30, took the view that the course
was "a clear success," and that students would thereby be "better fitted
to handle as practitioners the problems of their clients in the important
and difficult field covered, and also will have a clearer comprehension of
the social settings of the problems, than men exposed to the courses this
one supplements."' 72 He emphasized, however, a doubt which Professor
Powell had suggested: the trust was a remarkably flexible device, suitable to manifold uses other than the distribution of privately accumulated wealth; and to treat it solely in that context would be somewhat
&

17o Selected for special mention were: THoMAs CONYNGTON, HAROLD C. 1KNAPP,
PAUL W. PnKERTON, WILLS, ESTATES AND TRUSTS (1921); CLAY rIER0IOX,

TRUST DEPARTMENT IN 3ANKS AND TRUST COMPANIES (1925); WILLFORD I. KING,
WEALTH AND INCOME OF PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES (1923); FRANcLIN B.
KIRimRIE, J. E. STERRETT & H. P. WILLIS, THE MODERN TRUST COMPANY (1905);
JAMES L. MADDEN, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES (1927); JAMES G. SmTHr, Tiru
DEVELOPMENT OF TRUST COMPANIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1928); and GILBERT T.
STEPHENSON, LIVING TRUSTS (1926).

171Powell & Looker, Decedents' Estates: Illumination from Probate and Tax
IE
Records, 30 CoLum.L.IEv. 919 (1930). See also 4 RrcH RPDU. PowELL ON P.
PROPERTY 9-21 (1954).
172 MEMORANDA OF T=E MARSHALL CONFERENCES

707 (1929).
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like treating the law of contracts solely in the course on insurance. The
suggestion was not that the experimental treatment be abandoned, but
that it be supplemented by specific attention somewhere in the curriculum to the trust concept and its potentialities.
The casebook for this course :13 evoked from the reviewers no doubts
which the editor had not himself anticipated. The critics questioned
whether any significant integration of the three superseded courses had
been accomplished 174 (but one eminent reviewer referred specifically to
instances in which fusion had been effectively executed); 175 and they regretted the omission, or compressed treatment, of some subjects, notably
those which would have illustrated the versatility of the trust.-6 Although the nonlegal research which had been done was reflected in a
chapter entitled "Some Material Facts and Trends in Current American
Life," the nonlegal content was not sufficiently obtrusive to excite much
comment.' 7"

In 1937, Professor Powell published a second edition of his casebook
on future interests, although that subject matter had been included in
the volumes on trusts and estates; and this was followed, in 1940, by a
separate casebook on trusts. 7 ' The idea of the integrated course had
not taken hold at other schools, and the new books were designed primarily for them. 7 ' At Columbia, the course in trusts and estates was
continued until 1943-44, when it was divided into Trusts and Estates I,
given by Professor Powell with the 1937 casebook on future interests,
and Trusts and Estates II, given by Professor Cheatham with the 1940
casebook on trusts.8 0 In 1948-49, however, the course in trusts and es8
tates was reinstated.' '

173 RICHARD R. POWELL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW or TRUSTS AND ES-

TATES (2 vols., 1932-33).
174 Mfechem, Book Review, 19 IowA L.REv. 146 (1933); Griswold, Book Review,
34 COLu.L.REv. 387 (1934).
175 Simes, Book Review, 1 U.Cn-r.L.REv. 826, 827 (1934).
176 Reviews cited supra notes 171 and 172. The book contained a chapter 'introducing the trust concept in its substantive and remedial aspects.
177 Professor Mechem, however, took a rather scornful view of the statistics
on testamentary practices and of some of the "functional" terminology. Mechem,
Book Review, 19 IowA L.REv. 146, 150. Chapter 7 of the casebook also contained
philosophical and economic materials on inheritance.
178 RICHARD R. POWELL, CASES ON FUTURE INTERESTS (2d ed. 1937); RICHARD
R. POWELL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TRUSTS (1940).
179 RICHARD R. POWELL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TRUSTS Vii
(1940); COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, REPORT OF THE DEAN, SCHOOL OF LAW 8 (1940);

Bogert, Book Review, 29 GEo.L.J. 934 (1941); Van Hecke, Book Review, 41 COLUImL.
REv. 1306 (1941).
180 COLUMBAI UIVEnsrry BULL. OF INFOBMATIoN, ANNOUNCEMENT OF TIM SCHOOL
OF LAW 41 (1943-44).
181 Id. at 40 (1948-49). The division of the integrated course into two separate

courses had been solely a response to administrative problems raised by the accelerated wartime program, and as soon as the emergency had passed the integrated
course was restored. Again for administrative reasons, the materials relating to
trust administration have been made into a separate elective course; but the prin-
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4. Crime and Criminology. Crime was not, in itself, a ready-made
functional category. Some crimes were to be comprehended in the materials organized about type-fact situations-the family, marketing, and
labor. The residue posed for the committee formidable problems of internal classification. 82 On one point, there was early agreement: it was
desirable to continue the. separation between criminal procedure and the
substantive treatment, treating procedure as a method of state control. 83
The problem of how to treat the substantive content was more troublesome. The committee considered a classification which would entail
the cataloging and separate treatment of particular crimes, and one
which would "view the totality from the point of view of the person
committing the act and the social conditions under which he committed
it."184 But the literature on the causes of crime was in an unsatisfactory
state: "5 -

Obviously, progress along these lines depends on the work of specialists
in all these fields [medicine, psychiatry, psychology, eugenics, sociology, anciple of the integrated course has been preserved. The materials now used consist
of the two recent casebooks on trusts and future interests, supplemented by mimeographed material on wills and on taxation aspects of trust drafting.
In 1938, Professor Powell made a factual and legal study of title registration In
New York. Beginning with "a strong predisposition favorable to title registration,"
he was led by the facts discovered to quite different conclusions. llIlIMRD It.
POWELL, REGISTRATION OF THE TITLE TO LAND IN THE STATE OF NEW Yonic vii,
74-75 (1938). See McDougal & Brabner-Smith, Land Title Transfer: A Regression,
48 YALE L.J. 1125 (1939). In 1948, Professor McDougal, with Professor Haber,
published his own functional-sociological property casebook. MYiiES S. MODOUOAL
& DAviD

fABER, PROPERTY,

WEALTH, LAND:

ALLOCATION, PLANNING, AND DE-

VELOPMENT (1948). For a later statement of Professor Powell's view on the Institutional approach to property, see 1 RICHARD R. POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 7-34
(1949).
In the three other basic property courses (Possessory Estates, Vendor and Purchaser, Landlord and Tenant), no significant innovations were attempted. Possessory Estates and Vendor and Purchaser, in fact, seem to have been designed to accommodate portions of property law not susceptible of functional treatment. The
position of Landlord and Tenant was ambiguous. Professor Johnson had regarded
it as a course that ought to be absorbed in one dealing with land utilization. Memoranda of the Marshall Conferences 624, 634. But both Professor Handier and Professor Jacobs wished that their subjects could be presented more functionally and
more in social context. See MILTONIHANDLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW
OF VENDOR AND PURCHASER vii (1933); ALBERT C. JAcoBs, CASES AND MATERIALS
O THE LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT V (1932).

182 Document No. 31.
183 Id. at 133, 136; SuMMARY OF STUDIES 119-120. A proposed outline appears
at p. 139 of the Memoranda of the Marshall Conferences.
184 Document No. 3, at 134.
185 Id. at 136. Notwithstanding this state of mind in the committee, we are told
by Professor Oliphant that in 1927-28, the course in criminal law was "undergoing
a reorganization, one of the objects being to introduce into the course such material
as will illuminate the social background of the criminal law." It had not been possible to make a comprehensive outline of the revised course. The first term -was
to be devoted to procedure. "For the second term experimental type work is
planned. . . . How to utilize the data of courts, prisons, probation and parole
officers, juvenile courts, mental hygiene and child guidance clinics, psychopathic
hospitals, etc., in the study of the individual has not yet been worked out. Perhaps
a series of case histories may be the best solution." SUMMARY OF STUDIES 119-20.
See COLUMBIA UxivERsrrY, REPORT OF THE DEAN, SCHOOL OF LAW 16 (1928).
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thropology, economics, political economy, and history], most of them working without special reference to the crime problem. We are not aware of any
reduction to type fact situations that will enable us to follow and trace these
complicated threads. The red thread of the act we can follow. Its accompanying thread of procedure can be seen. But the variegated and entangled
strands of the individual and the social complex in the woof of the fabric
defies description. . .
The criminal act with its individual and social
factors is not yet in a satisfactory condition for either analysis or synthesis
and the work along these lines had best be done by significant research investigations.
The committee turned its attention to a research program, proposing
projects to determine the effects of certain legal rules, to inquire into
the actual administration of prosecutions and trials, to study methods
of detection and apprehension, and to be concerned with various sociological questions and problems of the treatment of criminals. 86 Personnel trained in law, sociology, psychiatry, administration, and statistics
would be required." 7 The committee suggested the establishment of a
school for the training of law enforcement officers, 8 8 and later a fullfledged proposal was made for the establishment of a school of crimin18 9
ology.
With matters in this somewhat inconclusive state, an arresting devel-,
opment occurred. At the request and with the financial support of the
Bureau of Social Hygiene, the Law School extended its auspices to a
survey for the purpose of determining whether or not it was desirable
to establish an institute of criminology and of criminal justice in the
United States, and of planning such an institute if it should prove tc'be
desirable. Professor Jerome Michael was selected as director, with a
staff of fourteen (including Professors Kidd and Moley, who constituted the faculty committee on crime and criminology). The survey
report, 90 "written as if with a battle-ax," '91 flung down a formidable
186 Document No. 31, 145 et seq.
187 Id. at 152.
188 Id. at 138.
189 Document No. 74. Oliphant says that the faculty had "adopted" a plan of action including the establishment of an Institute of Crime and Criminology, to begin with a staff of eight full-time experts in the various disciplines; and that "the
assembling of the necessary physical facilities and staff of experts for the study
and teaching of Criminal Law, of its administration, of crime and its causes, and
of the individual criminal is a project upon which the Law Faculty is in complete
agreement and which it proposes untiringly to pursue." SuMMRY OF STUDEs 113,'

115-16, 119.

190 Originally published as JEnoME MICHAEL & MORTnmER J. ADLER, ANT INSTITUTE
OF CnmNOLOGY AND OF CRnnLm
JUsTICE (1932); republished in somewhat revised form as JEROM MIICHAEL & MORTnMR J. ADLER, CRIME, LAW AND SOCIAL
SCIENCE (1933). See COLum3IA Uqrv
rSITy,
REPORT OF THE DEAN, SCHOOL OF LAW
12-13 (1929); id. at 10 (1930); id. at 6 (1932).
191Llewellyn, On Crime, Social Science, and Rationalism, in the symposium,
Crime, Law and Social Science, 34 COLUm.L.REv. 277 (1934).
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challenge to the suppositions underlying the entire scheme of reorganization. In the view of the authors, their pivotal theme was the relation
of law to the social sciences in general; and it was laid down that "[t] he
relation of criminology to the criminal law can . . . be taken as
typical of the relation, for instance, of economics and psychology to the
law of contracts, and, generally, of the relation of social science to
of the literature of criminollaw." 102 After a devastating examination
3
U
conclusions:
these
ogy, they announced
I. There is no scientific knowledge in the field of criminology.
II. EmpiricaL scientific research in criminology cannot be undertaken at
the present time.
They did go on to recommend the establishment of an institute, in the
belief that it was possible to develop an empirical science of criminology,
but only on condition that such an institute would forswear the "raw
empiricism" of previous research and devote itself, with radical changes
in existing methodology, to the development of theory and analysis in
psychology and sociology, on which criminology was dependent.10 4
In addition, the institute should endeavor to construct a "rational science"
of the criminal law," 5 based upon the principles of the "sciences" of
ethics and politics."6
The business of the survey was to inquire into the desirability of a
research institute, not into the problems of undergraduate professionat
education; but the implications of the report for the pending reorganization of the curriculum were obvious and were sometimes made explicit. Some portions bearing specifically on legal education require
full quotation:
We have chosen to orientate this book around the theme of the relation
of law and social science because of its contemporary importance. The rise
of what has been called sociological jurisprudence followed the development
of the social sciences in the latter half of the nineteenth century. More recently American university law schools have undertaken and projected reforms in legal education in the belief that the study of law should be more
closely affiliated with the study of the social sciences. Associated with this
movement in legal education, if not responsible for it, have been attempts
to make jurisprudence "realistic" or "scientific," to formulate the problems
of legal research as if they were problems in empirical social science. In
192 JEROME MICHAEL & MORTnME

J. ADLER,

ORn=o,

LAw AND SOCIAL SOiEnOE Ix,

X (1933).
193 Id. at 390.

194 Id. esp. at 391, 396, 399.
9 Id. at 397.
196 Id: at xiii
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short, the effort has been to introduce both the content and the methods of
the social sciences into the study and practice of the law. Current controversy of the issues thus raised has been profoundly unclear, largely because
empirical science has not been defined and distinguished from other kinds
of knowledge, and because of the ambiguity of the word "law" as denoting
both the body of propositions created by legislators and judges and the institutions and processes by which law in this first sense is made and administered. When such definitions and distinctions are made, it is readily seen
that none of the so-called social sciences are yet established as empirical
sciences; that the study of law in the first of the above senses is utterly
independent of them; and that empirical knowledge of social phenomena,
whether descriptive or scientific, is relevant to the practice, not the study,
1 7
of law. 9
A rational science of the Anglo-American criminal law does not now
198
.
exist.
These text books and case books reflect the level of instruction in the crim.
.
.
In
so far as American law schools are beginning to supplement the traditional
instruction in criminal law or procedure, they are doing so by offering, instruction, of a more or less superficial character, in criminology and in the
empirical aspects of the administration of the criminal law, using for the
latter purpose materials gathered from research such as we surveyed in Chapter IX [i.e., the Cleveland, Missouri, Illinois, New York, and Virginia crime
surveys]. There is no tendency discernible to study or teach the criminal law
as the subject matter of a rational science. Indeed, the whole contemporary
movement in legal research and education is in the direction of the empirical
and away from the rational. In so far as realism emphasizes the utility of
empirical knowledge in the solution of the practical problems which confront the legislator, the judge and the lawyer throughout the entire domain
of law, and the need for empirical sciences which will supply that knowledge,
realism or realistic jurisprudence is performing a real service., But in so
far as it ignores or underestimates the importance of the development of a
rational science of law and the utility of rational knowledge in the solution
of such problems, it is performing a disservice. 199

inal law which currently prevails in American law schools.

Since the turn of the century the law schools of this country have been interested in the rapprochement of, law and the social sciences. This interest
has unfortunately not been enlightened by the clear realization that no empirical sciences exist with which law could be profitably allied. .
While there is no question that the study and practice of law can employ
197 Id.

at xii-xiiL

198 Id. ap 371.
199 Id. at 372 n. 60.
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linowledge to be gained from the fields of psychology and social science, valid
and significant knowledge must exist in order to be employed.
The raw empiricism which has prevailed in psychology and social science
has its counterpart in the research of legal scholars. It goes by the name of
legal realism or realistic jurisprudence. It has been developed under the
influence of psychology and sociology; in fact, the precursor of realistic
jurisprudence was called sociological jurisprudence. It has, in addition, been
. .
guided in its aims and methods by current American pragmatism.
It is only when this movement becomes extremist and doctrinaire in its exclusive insistence upon the empirical study of "law in action" that it is a
influence;
serious evil. It has in some quarters exerted this unfortunate
200
analysis.
legal
rational
discouraged
and
depreciated
it has
The scope and purpose of the law school course in criminal law were
rather clearly defined by this position. It must be confined to the study
of Anglo-American law as a "rational science," on the basis of history,
comparative law, and analysis. 0 ' It could not be concerned with data
from nonexistent empirical sciences. The survey affirmed rather than
denied the existence of "descriptive knowledge" relating to the causes of
crime and to criminal law administration; 202 lawyers might even find
such knowledge useful; but, since it was not science, "a university
[would] consult its own dignity in declining to teach it." 203
Had these findings been as conclusive as the tone of the authors, there
would presumably have been a sudden end of the attempt to reorganize
the curriculum on functional lines and to relate it to the social sciences.
This, however, was not quite the case. In a spirited counter-attack,
Professor Karl Llewellyn summarized his reaction: "Altogether: as
stimulating, irritating, vitally wise and hopelessly absurd a book as I
have read." 20 Acknowledging that the authors had "with utter cogency" demonstrated the weaknesses of crude empiricism, he charged
them with a tendency toward crude rationalism.20 5 The "Himalayan"
standards which Michael and Adler had erected for empirical science
had led them to reject the substantial progress made by criminological
research in discovering some causes of crime and controlling some criminal behavior. 2'0 Much of the knowledge dismissed by the authors as
200 Id. at 422-23.
201 Id. at 367-70.
202 Id. at 398-99.
203 This, of course, is the language of Langdell (address delivered November 5,
1886, 3 L.Q.REv. 123, 124 (1887)), not of Michael and Adler; but it conveys the Import of their note 37, at 422.
204 Llewellyn, supra note 191, at 291. Other contributors to the symposium were
Beardsley Ruml, then dean of the Social Sciences at Chicago (The S9ubject Matter
of Criminology, 34 CoLmr.L.REv. 273 (1934)), and Richard McKeon, then Assistant
Professor Philosophy at Columbia (The Science of Criminology, id. at 291).
205 Llewellyn, 34 CoLum.L.REv. at 282, 291.
206 Id. at 285.
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mere common sense was "not the stock of knowledge common to the
people, but that common rather to the skilled in a given line." 207 In
the end, he concluded that "Evidently the most careful and trained common sense skepticism is needed to make either the rational or the empirical attack at all viable. Evidently, each needs the other, also, as a
complement. And that is good to know." 208
The survey report had its effect. No new casebook on criminal law
grew immediately out of the faculty's organized attempt to revise the
curriculum. Until 1929-30, Beale's casebook was used, as before;
thereafter, through 1934-35, the casebook was "to be announced"; not
until 1935-36 was it announced as Michael and Wechsler's Cases and
Materials on Criminal Law and Its Administration, in mimeographed
form.209 'And it is reasonable to surmise that it may have had a generally
moderating effect, injecting an element of skepticism into the quest for
answers from the social sciences and a note of caution into the process
207 Id. at 286.

208 Id. at 291.
209 See the Law School announcements for the years in question. See also CotLumBIA UNIvEnSITY, REPORT OF THE DEAN, SCHOOL OF LAW 10-11 (1935). The casebook

(JEROME MICHAEL & HERBERT WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMNISTRATION:
CASES, STATUTES AND COMMENTARIES (1940)) belongs to a later and more mature
period than that under consideration in this paper, but its principal characteristics
require mention. While it built on the conclusions of Crime, Law and Social
Science, it was by no means a vehicle for the crudely rationalistic study of criminal
law. The concept of law as a means of attaining social ends was made explicit and
central. The assertion, evaluation, and exploration of propositions concerning
social values was held to be the province of ethics and politics, and it was believed
that such propositions could be objectively established. With respect to the tendency of law to attain the ends sought, and with respect to the causes and the control of crime, existing knowledge might be mere common sense or merely descriptive, but it was not, therefore, despised. "Though the extent to which the investigations that have been made have substantially enlarged our fundamental knowledge of the causes of crime may be disputed, they certainly have contributed a
wealth of material descriptive of those members of the convict population who have
been examined." (p. 21) The use made of relevant nonlegal material was more extensive (see the table at p. 1337) and more discriminating than in any previous casebook, regardless of its pretensions. Indeed, the reviewers, with varying degrees of
insight, regarded the book as a direct product of the socio-functional approach:
"[F]unctional approach

. . . modernistic

.

.

.,"

Strahorn, Book Review, 54

HAuv.L.REv. 1414, 1415 (1941); "Instructors who do not feel conversant with literature on the sociology of law need not be filled with consternation when they read of
this book as a splendid example of the fruitfulness of that approach," Gausewitz,
"
Book Review, 26 IowA L.REv. 908, 914, (1941); "[Slocial engineering ...
Stumberg, Book Review, 89 U.PA.L.REv. 1123, 1125; "[D]efinitely the fartherest
movement yet on the functional approach side," Puttkammer, Book Review, 8
U.Cni.L.Rnv. 386, 3S7 (1941); "Their book is proof that the progressive elements
in Sociological jurisprudence and in legal realism have finally overcome the period
of growing pains and can pass free and adult among men," Riesman, Law and
Social Science: A Report on Michael and Wechsler's Classbook on Criminal Law
and Administration, 50 YALE L.J. 636, 653 (1941). In fact, the book was a fulfillment of expectations which might justifiably have been based upon a union of the
rational and empirical methods, fortified by common-sense skepticism.

HeinOnline -- 8 J. Legal Educ. 47 1955-1956

JOURNAL OF LEGAL EwUCATION

[VOL. 8

of scrapping classifications which had utility for the rational study of
2 10

law.

5. Marketing. The whole area of "business relations" was conceived
of as falling into four or more divisions: Marketing, Business Organizations, Finance and Credit, Labor Relations, and possibly Risk and/or
Production. 2" Nonlegal scholarship in the field of business relations
was regarded as (1) theoretical, and unrelated to the data of economic
life; or (2) devoted to the collection of unrelated business or economic
facts; or (3) devoted to "an attempt to see the entire business mechanism as a homogeneous composite of specialized and interacting agencies,
performing inter-dependent processes in the total business of getting
the world fed, clothed, housed, educated, and amused." 212 The first
two kinds were rejected as having no contribution to make to a scheme
of classification which would facilitate the reception of vital nonlegal
data. The third was found more promising, and the principal divisions
of the classification were selected because research of this kind tended
to center about them as focal points.
There were three basic documents on marketing. 21 3 They proceeded,
though tentatively, on the "assumption that marketing is a worth-while
grouping of materials, legal and nonlegal, for purposes of curriculum
building." 214 They were primarily concerned with problems of internal
organization. Confronted with fact situations of extreme complexity,
the committee decided to "attack the division of this field primarily on
the fact side, leaving, for the moment, untouched, the question of integrating the fact material with the law." 2U After examining the literature of marketing, the committee considered three possible bases of
For Dean Smith's evaluation of the survey report, see CoLrmrA UNIVERSITY,
Somewhat incongruously, he referred to it, along with Berle & Means's Modem Corporationand Private Property,
as furnishing "proof of the value of coordinated research in law and related fields,
the need of which has been urged by the Faculty of Columbia Law School during the
last seven years .
The researches of Professor Moley (CoLtmm A UmvERsry, REPORT OF THE DEAN,
SCHOOL OF LAW 22 (1928); id. at 13 (1929); id. at 10 (1930)) on criminal law and
procedure appear to have resulted in three articles, an address, and two semi-popular books: The Vanishing Jury, 2 So.CALIF.L.REv. 97 (1928); The Initiation of
Criminal Prosecutions by Indictment or Information, 29 MiCH.L.REV. 403 (1931);
The Use of the Information in Criminal Cases, 17 A.B.A.J. 292 (1931); The Prosecuter and the Plea of Guilty, 53 A.B.A.REIp. 541 (1928); PoLrrics AND CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION (1929); and Oun CR= L COURTS (1930).
Professor Jerome Hall's significant book, Theft, Law and Soeiety (1935; 2d ed.
1952), was clearly an application of the kind of thinking suggested in Document
No. 31. See COLUMBIA UNIvERsITY, REPORT OF TiE DEA-N, SCHOOL OF LAw 17
(1935).
211 SUMMARY OF STUDIES 128.
212 Id. at 130.
213 Documents 33, 34, and 35.
P,4 Document No. 33 at 168.
210

REPORT OF T=E DEAx, SCHOOL OF LAW 6-7 (1932).

215 Ibid.
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classification. The first was that of the processes (or functions or activities) involved in marketing; the second was that of the classes of
commodities involved; and the third was that of the agencies (functionaries organized and acting in typical, largely standardized positions
and in typical, largely standardized ways) found active in the processes
of marketing. 1 " The preliminary preference seems to have been for
the organization based on processes, or functions, as best facilitating the
integration of legal and nonlegal materials. 21 7 Later, however, opinion
seems to have shifted to the view that "[s]o far as we have developed
in our society well differentiated specialized marketing agencies or functionaries, and so far as a sufficient number of important legal problems
cluster about them, such agencies should be treated in special courses." 218
Examples were to be found in transportation, storage, and risk-bearing.
Only the residue left after this type of allocation would be organized in
terms of basic marketing processes.
But the curriculum was little affected by such labors in this field.
Trade Regulation, which of course concerns the marketing process, was
already a well established course; indeed, the committee appears to
have regarded it almost as one of the traditional courses which would
raise problems if the broader functional classification were adopted. 2 9
The only course outline offered by the committee was one on Competitive
Practices. 220 No new casebook in that segment of the field was published by a member of the Columbia faculty until 1937.221 It was gratefully reviewed by both practicing lawyers and teachers, and, although it
made significant use of "secular" 22 material, it was not regarded as unconventional.2 23
Llewellyn's Cases and Materials on Sales, published in 1930, was a
radical departure from precedent. It focused on the business transaction rather than on traditional legal categories, but it was a far cry from
the functionalism of the faculty seminar. It can hardly be said to have
utilized social science materials directly, however rich it was in the flavor
of the market and however keen its Mansfieldian sensitiveness to mercantile usage. On the premise that Llewellyn is his own best reviewer,
I quote portions of the Introduction relevant to the questions under discussion:
216 Id. at 15.
217 Document No. 35.
218 SumzwMY or STUDiEs 134-35.
219 Document No. 33, at 189.
220 Id. at 186.
AND OTnEn MATERIALS ON TRADE REGULATION (1937).
222 Hamilton, Book Review, 38 CoLu..L.REv. 953, 954 (1938).
223 See reviews by Kirsch, 25 A.B.A.J. 64 (1939); McAllister, 23 IowA L.REv. 138
(1937); Derenberg, 15 N.Y.U.L.Q.REV. 147 (1937); McClintock, 5 U.Cni.L.REv-. 328
(1938); and Payne, 24 VA.L.REV. 701 (1938).
221 HANDLER, CASES

8 Journal of Legal Ed.No.1-4
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Doctrine is therefore emphasized, as doctrine must be; but it is emphasized as the first step in a wider process of seeing what law means and of
bringing it to bear on facts. The picture is not complete. To fill it out would
need a vast body of descriptive and statistical economic material which is as
yet lacking, Partly the lack moves from the prohibitive amount of time required in turning out what seemed a worthwhile teaching tool. Partly it
moves from the fact that the book is directed to law students, not to students
of business; legal technique thus moves into the foreground, and an understanding of the business situation becomes not a primary object, but a means
to making the legal job intelligible. Finally, there is the question of space
and technique. Sooner or later we must learn to bring to bear on our law
curriculum an increased body of fact information; but the art is not easy,
and we have to reckon, while it is being learned, with limitations of time
and space. In the meantime, the descriptions of fact background inserted
.224
in the book must serve as best they can.
The book therefore approaches Sales law as a matter of marketing, as a
tool of modern business in a credit economy in which future contracts are
the rule. .
.
So far as concerns seeing the law in the light of its
effects, the book takes up the practices of the laymen who are interested and
views the contract as a device for allocating various business risks; it takes
up the presumptions of Sales law as a device for allocating risks which the
parties have not expressly covered. The book errs, I think, in too happily
assuming the needs of buyers and sellers to be the needs of the community,
and in rarely reaching beyond business practice in evaluation of the legal
rules. There again, time for building a wider foundation for judgment has
been lacking.2 25
224 KARL

N.

LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TIE LAW OF SALES xi (1930).

"In this same aspect of deepening the student's insight into the ways of tile law,
an effort has been made to draw on suggestions from the other social sciences.
From modern psychology, especially in reference to the processes of decision and
to the use of rationalization to make the decision appear acceptable to bar and
other benches. From experimental logic, in the attempt to present each new case
as in fact a new case, and to show"rules' as formulae the actual content of which
varies with each new decision which is made. From social psychology, in the effort
to show how patterns of thought, and especially legal concepts, influence the course
of decision; as also to show how changes of fact background alter old legal concepts, or bring forth new. From anthropology and sociology, in relation to the
'diffusion' or 'contagion' of a 'culture complex'; this inclues the process that we
know in law as reasoning from analogy, but includes a deal beyond; it is a line
of thought which brings peculiar light into the field of documents of title. Nowhere does the utility of such borrowed suggestions appear more clearly than tn
the historical aspects of the book." Id. at xi-xil. But the book did not offer
social science materials in homeopathic doses. The author had himself assimilated
and brought to bear the contributions of nonlegal disciplines, and had utilized them
in preparing background materials which a lawyer or law student could appreciate
without special conditioning.
225I.
at xv (the last two sentences being taken from n. 3). Llewellyn's dissection of the concept of title, clearly a product of the treatment of sales law as a
matter of allocating business risks, has since become a standard tool of sales law
analysis. And Mr. Llewellyn is my authority for the statement that the Sales
article of the Uniform Commercial Code is another direct product of the type of
treatment exemplified by the casebook.
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Three reviewers complained of the secular content. One, identifying
it with economics, thought that such matters could be included in the
226 the
curriculum only at the expense of good professional training;
others could neither understand nor accept the implication that prelegal
education did not supply sufficient understanding of the social and ecoIn general, however, the business background
nomic background.22
materials were accepted with enthusiasm, perhaps, in part, because they
were offered simply as such, with a minimum of the trappings of social
228
science.
6. Finance and credit. The basic memorandum 229 on this, the third
of the broad divisions of the field of business relations, treated the topic
as divisible into three parts: commercial bank credit, security devices,
and corporate finance. The third of these was promptly relinquished
to the business organization group. 30 So complex were the problems
of internal organization that they led the committee to include in its
report one of the most searching analyses of the general problem of
curricular organization to be found in the records. Primary emphasis was given to the first of the three internal divisions: "The Medium
of Exchange: Commercial Bank Credit." 231 One passage in the committee's report is of special interest:
The organization proposed has curious and suspicious resemblance to the
present plans of the two members of the committee.232 The arguments sound
curiously like defense reactions against those same two members being forced
to rethink their field in new and different terms. Despite these facts, the
committee are disposed to believe their arguments both honest and sound.
226 Morrow, Book Review, 15 IowA. L.REv. 515, 516 (1930).
227 Whiteside, Book Review, 16 CORNELL L.Q. 136, 140-41 (1930); Moreland, Book
Review, 19 KY.L.J. 275, 276 (1931).
228 Turner, Book Review, 30 CoTum.L.REv. 904, 905 (1930). See also reviews by
Havighurst, 36 W.VA.L.REv. 310 (1930); Waite, 28 MIIcH.L.REv. 947 (1930); Townsend, 39 YALE L.J. 1080 (1930); McCurdy, 44 HIAXv.L.REv. 140 (1930); Hamilton, 8 N.Y.U.L.Q.REV. 341 (1930); Britton, 79 U.PA.L.REv. 377 (1931); Moore, 5

TuL.L.REv. 504 (1931).

Professor Hanna's treatise, THE LAw OF C0OPERATIVE MARKETING AssOCIATioNS

(1931), may perhaps be regarded as an outgrowth of the faculty's deliberations in
this field, although Dean Smith treated it as being "in the general field of security
UNIVERSITY, REPORT OF THE DEAi, SCHOOL OF LAW 14-15 (1929).
law." COLumih&
229 Document No. 40.
230 d. at 258, 286. Another memorandum, contemplating an organization from
the point of view of the financial executive in an industrial or commercial concern
and positing the functional necessity of including corporate finance, appears to have
had little influence. Document No. 69.
231 Id. at 259 et seq. where an eighteen-page course outline is reproduced. In
Oliphant's summary, almost exclusive attention is given to this topic; he notes that
corporate finance was to be subsumed under business organizations, but makes no
reference to security, merely stating that no agreement was reached as to the
disposition of matters not included in commercial bank credit or corporate finance.
SUMARY OF STUDIES 157.

232 Llewellyn and Moore. See note 5 supra.
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For the inquiry into bank credit assumed its present form as a result of
hard, long thinking along lines substantially similar to those which we find
at the basis of our present proposal for reorganization. And the line-up in
terms of security devices has assumed its present shape as a result of similar
thinking, colored not by a traditional approach to legal material, but by insistent suggestion derived from sociology, anthropology, and behaviorism,
and by the light that insistent suggestion sheds on the activity of men and
33
judges.2

In 1927-28, a course on commercial bank credit was substituted for
the old course on bills and notes; 234 but in 1929, Underhill Moore went
to Yale, and thereafter the place of Bills and Notes in the Columbia
2 35
curriculum remained unchallenged.
Security, the somewhat slighted twin of commercial bank credit, was
another matter. The committee's preliminary conception had been of
a category called commercial credit-chiefly, credit as between buyer and
seller.2 36 But a modification of the strictly functional or institutional
approach was thought to be necessary because of the complexity and
the technical character of legal security devices. In this field, legal concepts were so important and intricate a part of the fact situation that
233 Document No. 40 at 259.
234 COLuMBIA UprVERSITY, REPORT oF THE DEAN, SCHOOL or LAW 17 (1928). The
announcements, however, continued to list Bills and Notes, with Commercial Bank
Credit as a seminar. In 1928-29, the vehicle for the course in bills and notes was
announced as MOORE, CASES ON THE CHECKING ACCOUNT (mimeographed).
235 Professor Moore set forth his views on this area of the law in Moore & Hope,
An Institutional Approach to the Law of Commercial Banking, 38 YALE L.J. 703
(1929). See also Moore & Sussmann (sic), The Lawyer's Law, 41 YALE L.J. 566 (1932).
At Yale, he developed a set of mimeographed materials on Commercial Bank rcdit.
In 1932, a third edition of his Cases on Bills and Notes was published, but does not
appear to have been reviewed. Beginning in 1927, he published a remarkable series of articles based on his institutional approach: Moore & Shamos, Interest on
the Balance of Checking Accounts, 27 CoLu.L.REv. 633 (1927); Moore & Sussman,
The Current Account and Set-offs between an Insolvent Bank and Its Customer,
41 YALE L.J. 1109 (1932); Moore & Sussman, Legal and Institutional Methods Applied to the Debiting of Direct Discounts-I. Legal Method: Banker's Set-off, 40
YAT L.J. 381 (1931); II. Institutional Method, id. at 555 (1931); III. The Connecticut Studies, id. at 752 (1931); IV.
The South Carolina and Pennsylvania
Studies, id. at 928 (1931); V. The New York Study, id. at 1055 (1931); VI. The Decisions, the Institutions, and the Degrees of Deviation, id. at 1219 (1931); Moore,
Sussman, and Brand, Legal and Institutional Methods Applied to Orders to Stop
Payment of Checks-I. Legal Method, 42 YALE L.J. 817 (1933); II. Institutional
Method, id. at 1198 (1933); Moore, Sussman, & Corstvet, Drawing against Uncollected Checks: I, 45 YALE L.J. 1 (1935); II, id. at 260 (1935). To attempt an analysis
of these writings would, among other things, take us far from present concerns,
which have to do with the faculty deliberations and their effect on the Columbia
curriculum, and I shall not make the attempt.
Some idea of the intensity of Moore's devotion to the institutional and factual
approach is conveyed by the fact, related to me by Professor Llewellyn, that when
Moore embarked upon such studies, he burned the contents of a roomful of filing
cabinets, representing some eighteen years of effort to annotate all the American
cases on bills and notes. The material had been gathered on the basis of rejected
hypotheses.
236 Document No. 40 at 10-11.
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special attention had to be given to a plan of organization which would
bring them clearly into focus. Accordingly, the category was redefined
as "legal security devices, with special reference to commercial credit." 237
A course on security was offered for the first time in 1927-28 by Professors Llewellyn and Douglas, 3 8 and was continued by Professor Hanna,
who, in 1932, published his Cases and Other Materials on Security.
The book treated, in addition to suretyship and real estate mortgages,
pledges, letters of credit, trust receipts, chattel mortgages, and conditional sales. "Much effort," the editor said, had been expended "to explain the contemporary business background, partly by cases containing
exposition of business practice, partly by current business forms, and
partly by notes on non-legal topics." 239 But insight into the problems
of constructing such a casebook was afforded in the Preface: 240
My original outline was based more on business uses than the outline that
finally determined the contents of this volume. It is hard to escape from the
tyranny of one's own training in suretyship and mortgages. The diversity of
the uses of third person and land security makes it difficult, if not impossible,
to organize these topics except on a basis of legal analysis. The leading business schools have accomplished much in collecting, classifying, and cataloguing business materials, but even when one supplements their achievements with expensive research, the results are often disappointing when they
are not merely negative. Some of the most exacting of legal scholarship has
always been devoted to suretyship and real estate mortgages. The existing
organizations of these courses represent so nearly a consensus of the opinions of authorities that one may not lightly disregard them. After much
experiment and discussion I have followed for the most part a conventional
outline of both suretyship and real estate mortgages.
The reviewers were unanimously enthusiastic, welcoming both the plan
of organization and the background materials. 24 ' The second edition,
published in 1940, was similarly received, although by-that time a reviewer could refer to its arrangement as "orthodox." 242 In short, the
237 Ibid. It will be recalled that Dean Stone had suggested the organization of
a course assembling the law relating to various security devices. See note 33 supra.
Professor Hanna had been doing research directed to this possibility for some time.
See COLumBIA UNIVERSITY, REPORT OF THE DEAIN, SCHOOL OF LAW 17 (1928); id. at
14 (1929) ; id. at 14 (1930) ; id. at 9 (1932).
238 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, REPOnT OF THE DEAN, SCHOOL OF LAW 17 (1928).
It was
239 JOHN HAN A, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON SECURITY vii (1932).

not the first such casebook.

See

WESLEY A. STURGES,

CASES AND MATERIALS ON

CREDIT TANSACTIONS (1930).
240 Id. at vil-viii.
241 See the reviews by Payne, 82 U.PA.L.IEv. 85 (1933); Kidd, 21 CALIF.L.tEv.
641 (1933); Grade, 28 ILT-L.REv. 306 (1933); Billig, 46 HARv.L.REv. 1351 (1933);
Cormack, 6 So.CAF.L.REv. 357 (1933); and the brief notice in 17 MnMn.L.REv.
460 (1933).
242Meriwether, Book Review, 29 CAL..L.REv. 447 (1941). See also reviews by
Crane, 30 GEo.L.J. 224 (1941); Gerber, 89 U.Pa.L.ItEv. 998 (1941); and the brief
notice in 25 MINi.L.REv. 819 (1941). In 1952, a "re-edited second edition" appeared
in response to the need for abbreviation.
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book achieved, if not an elegantly functional treatment, (1) a material
saving of time by compressing into one course the materials of suretyship and mortgages and more besides (although no attempt was made
to "merge" the various devices) ; 243 and (2) a framework in which the
available legal devices could be viewed comparatively in the light of their
commercial utility.
Nowhere in the Memoranda of the Marshall Conferences nor in the
Summary of Studies is there reference to the problem of the unsecured
creditor and the insolvent debtor, although that problem would seem to
be relevant to the general area of finance and credit. Dean Stone, however, had suggested a course on creditors' rights;2 44 such a course was
offered in 1929-30; 24 and in 1931, Professor Hanna published his
Cases and Materials on the Law of Creditors' Rights. The book was
designed to facilitate the "comparative study of the various ways of
protecting an unsecured creditor" 24 and covered enforcement of judgment, fraudulent conveyances, general assignments, creditors' agreements, and receivership in addition to bankruptcy. "In the nature of
things the materials are largely legal, in contrast to the book on Security
in which there seems a legitimate occasion for the inclusion of a generous amount of non-legal discussions." 247 One reviewer called the book
"epoch-making," 24 and all were enthusiastic.2 9 Here is an instance, it
seems to me, in which a tough-minded lawyer, dealing with essentially
procedural materials, succeeded in being more functional than the faculty
planners, and succeeded very well indeed.
243 See the Preface to the second edition.
244 See note 32 supra.

245 COLumBIA UNIVERSiTY BuLL. OF INFOI3LATION: SCiIOL OF LAW 33 (1929-30).
246 JOHN HANNA, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF CREDITORS' RIGHnTS V1

(1931). The statement (p. vii) that the organization was primarily from the viewpoint of law administration suggests that the faculty was thinking of that pigeonhole as the ultimate destination of such topics.
247 Ibid.

248 Billig, Book Review, 17 CORNELL L.Q. 718 (1932).
249 Glenn, Book Review, 32 CoL m.L.REv. 149 (1932); Lloyd, Book Review, 81
U.PA.L.REv. 240 (1932); Radin, Book Review, 21 CALIF.L.REv. 182 (1933); Cormack, Book Review, 6 So.C0LIF.L.Rnv. 359 (1933). The second edition (1935) was
likewise approved, Glenn, Book Review, 36 COLu.L.REv. 176 (1936), though it was
suggested that the arrangement of materials might be more "imaginative and intricate," Mcflougal, Book Review, 45 YALE L.J. 1159 (1936), and even that the book
should be supplemented by clinical training. Billig, Book Review 25 GEO.L.J. 246
(1936). This was followed by JoHN HANNA & JAs. A. McLAUGNLm, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CREDITORS' RIGHTS (3d ed. 1939); HANNA & IACLACULAN, CASES

(4th ed., two volumes, 1948, 1949) ; and a consolidated fourth edition, in one volume, in 1951. Also in 1935, Professor Hanna published separately the portion of the casebook dealing with bankruptcy, under the
title Cases and Materials on Bankruptcy.
AND MATERIALS ON CREDITORS' RIGHTS

Reference should also be made to HERMAN N. FINKELSTEIN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF

COiMMERCIAL LETTERS OF CREDIT (1930), a graduate dissertation with an introduction by Professor Llewellyn treating the business and economic background.
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7. Labor. Since Industrial Relations was a firmly established component of the curriculum, the task of the committee assigned to this
fourth division of the field of business relations was not to innovate but
to suggest methods and directions for further progress. Typically, further progress in such a venture means broadening scope and searching
for additional nonlegal material of relevance, in the face of multiplying
legal materials, and is not easily attained. The committee's report, accordingly, took a long-range view instead of suggesting immediate
changes. It suggested a marshalling of the University's personnel assets,
in all departments, for a cooperative attack on the problems of research
and course organization.2 50 Its comprehensive outline and discussion
of the economic aspects of labor problems was intended as a basis for
continuing research rather than for immediate course construction. It
was not until 1944 that a member of the Columbia faculty published a
new casebook on labor law. 5'
8. Risk and risk-bearing. In 1921, Protessor Frank H. Knight,
then of the University of Iowa, published his Risk, Uncertainty, and
Profit, a highly abstract, but today still significant, contrihution to economic theory. The concepts of risk and uncertainty were carefully
analyzed and differentiated, and given position in the systematic theory
of profit and capital. The focus was upon the "role of the entrepreneur
.

the recognized 'central figure' of the system, and o[n] the
forces which fix the remuneration of his special function." 25' This essay
.

.

in pure economic theory was written without the remotest reference to
the problems of professional education in schools of business, to say
nothing of law schools. But, at the suggestion of Dean Leon C. Marshall, Professor Charles 0. Hardy, a colleague of Professor Knight's,
undertook to prepare the materials for a course on risk and risk-bearing,
which was to become a major functional category in the curriculum
of the University of Chicago School of Business.25 From the beginning,
there was some doubt as to the soundness of this grouping of materials; 2 and nothing in Professor Knight's analysis called very obviously
for centering professional business instruction around the concept of
risk as a functional category. The subjects covered were distinctly
miscellaneous from any point of view except that which concentrated
-on the common element of risk or uncertainty: elimination and transfer of risk; the business cycle; business forecasting; investment of
250 Document No. 41 at 293-294.
251MILTON HANDLER, CASEs AND MATERiALS ON LABOR LAW (1944), continued
.as MILTON HANDLER & P. R. HAYS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABoR LAW (1950),
-with a revised 1951 edition by the same editors.
252 FRAIMK H. K.NIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT iX (1921).
253 CHARLES 0. HARDY, RISK AND RISK-BEARING viii, xi, xv (1923).
254I1. at xiL
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capital; security markets; speculation; hedging; life, fire, and miscellaneous property insurance; guaranty and suretyship; and risks of
labor.
In 1924, Professor Edwin W. Patterson published an article entitled,
"The Apportionment of Business Risks Through Legal Devices." '
At the outset, he cited Hardy's Risk and Risk-Bearing, but guardedlyas an example of a possible tendency on the part of some economists to
overemphasize the importance of the concept.150 Accepting risk as a
pervasive and significant phenomenon in economic activity, he set out to
trace, in a tentative and experimental way, the manner in which the courts,
by applying or purporting to apply certain legal norms, were consciously
or unconsciously determining the apportionment of risks. The objective
was to gain some insight "into the extent to which the operation of the
legal system facilitates the apportionment of risks in accordance with
economic needs and practices, into the economic policies which are fostered or retarded by the operation of legal devices, and chiefly into the
smoothness and precision, or lack of it, with which legal devices operate
as technical instruments." 25 The approach was modest and skeptical,
and the legal concepts examined were limited to four associated with contract and other consensual relations: (1) impossibility of performance,
(2) the duty of care imposed on a bailee, (3) mutual mistake, and (4)
implied warranties. Each of these was regarded as a doctrinal device for
risk apportionment, and it was suggested that the problems involved might
advantageously be stated as problems of risk-bearing rather than as "problems in the application of legal concepts which are based upon an abstraction of purely physical or other adventitious factors in the business
relation in question." 5' Whether the results reached by the courts
were socially and economically expedient could be judged only by the
standards of the arm-chair philosopher: "Only when we have adequate
data as to business practices and their social and economic consequences,
will we be in a position to formulate new concepts and rules for the apportionment of risks. Meanwhile, the apportionment of risks will be
carried on through the jurist's traditional method of 'casual observation"
and we may only hope that the law's cultural lag will be minimized." 259,
255 24 CoLum.L.REV. 335 (1924).
256 Ibid.
257hI. at 335-36. There may possibly have been a remoter

objetive, looking toward the organization of problems for teaching or research: "The question then
arises, how can we hope to isolate the problem of risk-apportionment from Its Protean manifestations and treat it as if it were a unit? What good would be accomplished by bringing together all the problems of risk-bearing from diverse fields of
the law, even if we could?" Id. at 335.
258 hI. at 359.
259 Ibid.
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Here was insight that could: enrich the study of law: insight into the
operation of law as a means of dealing with the fundamental hazards
of life and business. Here was a framework for criticism; but, typically,
and necessarily, it stopped short of supplying standards for criticism.
Those the law could not supply, and they were hard to find. There the
matter rested until the faculty's mobilization for attack upon the problems of reorganization of the curriculum summoned all such resources
to the firing line. If risk was a pervasive and significant problem of
economic life, and if rules of law could be fruitfully treated as devices
for risk apportionment, why not group the rules about the problem for
study? Such a classification had its counterpart in the business schools,
and one might hope that parallel statement of the problems and parallel
study would bring to light economic theory and factual information
260
which would supply standards of criticism. The committee's report
pursued this possibility with enthusiasm. It stated twelve reasons for
believing that the conception of risk was a valuable method of approach
to many legal problems. It included a short bibliography of economic
materials. 26 ' Its forty-page outline of "a course or courses on risk and
risk-bearing" 262 set forth an overwhelming diversity of subject matter
relating to risks: the doctrine of respondeat superior in agency; workmen's compensation acts; implied warranties in sales; the doctrine of
Price v. Neal; 263 liability for negligence; liability without fault; hedging; a series of matters regarded as risks created by the imperfect operation of legal machinery, including the retroactive effect of judicial decisions, supervening illegality, vexatious and unfounded litigation, erroneous judgments, and ignorance or mistake of law; the Statute of Frauds,
the parol evidence rule, and the best-evidence rule ("devices to minimize
the risks of oral transactions"); laws relating to risks incurred in the
production of goods, including nuisance, building codes, zoning ordinances, etc., from the selection of the plant site to the marketing of the
product; contract, as the pervasive device for apportioning business risk;
and, of course, insurance. 64
260 Document No. 45. See SUMMARY OF STUDIES 160.
261 Including JonN D. BLACK, INTRODUCTION TO PRODUCTION ECONOICS (1926);
4CHARLES 0. HARDY, Risr AND RIsK-BEARUING (1923); FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK,
UNCErITAinTY, AN PnoFir (1921); and L. C. MARSHALL, BusnuEss ADmisTRATION

(1921). Document No. 45, at 363.
262 Document No. 45, at 364.
263 3 Burr. 1354, 97 Eng.Rep. 871 (K.B. 1762). See Woodward, The Risk of Foroery or Alteration of Negotiable Instruments, 24 COLum.L.REV. 469 (1924).
264 Compare the restraint of Professor Patterson's article, supra note 255, and of
his comment on type-fact situations, Document No. 54, in which he said (at p. 452):
"My present hypothesis is that I cannot come anywhere near to enumerating all
of the type-fact situations which will be found significant for the training of superlawyers for their professional activities." See also Patterson, Can Law Be Scientiflo? 25 ILL.L.R~v. 121, 122 (1930): ". . . I am addressing those who . . .
have felt a sense of frustration in their efforts to use scientific methods in law."
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Risk was a pervasive phenomenon indeed; around it could be clustered
a startling miscellany of legal topics, and there would result encroachment not only on traditional courses but on newly defined groupings as
well. Moreover, while large segments of the existing curriculum were
included, they were not provided for in their entirety; and this was notably true of torts.26 5 It is not surprising that the adoption of such a
conception as a basis for course organization was "much debated," "I
nor that, after the fervor of the concerted faculty exploration had abated,
and he was confronted with the preparation of materials for the use of
law students, Professor Patterson limited himself to recognition of the
fact that the course in insurance was already a functional organization
of materials bearing on the important core of vocational risk-bearers. 27
His casebook on insurance, now in its third edition,26 8 was "designed to
present current problems of insurance law in their relations to insurance
institutions and business practices without sacrificing either the historical
development or the technical analysis of legal doctrines." 269 The organization featured the principal aspects of the insurance business: the
carrier in its legal and financial structure and its relation to the state; the
interests of those insured; the selection and control of risks; the marketing of insurance protection; and the settlement of claims. A bibliography, chiefly of nonlegal materials, was included; nonlegal materials
were interspersed with the cases and collected in an appendix, which
included mortality tables; information on classes of life policies, with
life insurance premium tables; material on the selection of risks; policy
forms; and material on fire insurance rates. The basic features were
retained and supplemented in the later editions. The reviewers, warm in
their praise, were expressly appreciative of the arrangement and of the
"pertinent and valuable economic information." 270
265 Torts were not considered elsewhere except in the report of the committee on
labor, which dealt with industrial accident and disease. Document No. 41 at 297.
Professor Patterson had earlier remarked that the business administrator's risk
did not exhaust the problem, "but it includes a large and, if volume of litigation Is
the test, the most important part of it." Patterson, The Apportionment of Business
Risks through Legal Devices, 24 CoLum.L.REv. 335 (1924). A special effort seems
to have been made to encompass as much tort law as possible. Thus a consideration of the risks of special types of enterprises, such as publishing, would have
brought libel (and also a bit of copyright) into the fold.
266 SmM ARY OF STUDIES 160.
2671bid.
Professor Douglas,

who attributed his inspiration to Professor Moore,
was also impressed by the analysis of legal concepts in terms of the allocation of'
business risks. See Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk I, 38.
Professor Patterson's continued InYALE L.J. 584 (1929); II, id. at 720 (1929).
terest in the subject is indicated by his articles, Unsecured Ureditor's Insurance,
31 COL m.L.REv. 212 (1931), and Hedging and Wagering on, ProduceBachanges, 40
YALE L.J. 843 (1931).
268E. W. PATTEsON, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON

H

LAW OF INsUiAcE

(1932); second edition (1947); third edition (1955).
',269 Id. at v (1st ed. 1932).
270 Goble, Book Review, 43 YALE L.J. 688, 690 (1934). See also reviews by Langmaid, 21 CALiF.L.REv. 189 (1933); Updegraff, 18 IowA L.REV. 578 (1933); and
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I am indebted to Professor Patterson for the following comment on
the fate of the projected course on risk and risk-bearing: 271
These main factors were influential:
1. The initial enthusiasm for behaviorism and logical positivism was tempered by the sober reflection that legal evaluations cannot, or should not,
dispense with the ideas of fault, wilfullness and other conscious motivations
of human conduct. This led to the conclusion that a broad course in risk
and risk-bearing would sever tort and contract problems from their traditional
legal and moral roots and would thus require that many problems be taken
up twice in different courses. . . . Still, the effect of our faculty discussions was, I believe, to give greater emphasis to the risk-approach in both
torts and contracts, and in commercial law as well.
2. To organize a course in risk-bearing would have aroused (quite understandable) opposition from "vested interests," especially from my esteemed
colleague, Professor (later Dean) Young B. Smith, who was devoted to the
course in Torts. He was, I believe, influenced by the risk-approach.
3. After Oliphant, Moore, Yntema and Marshall left, the Columbia faculty, which had been "lost in the stars" (an exciting excursion, by the way),
came down to reorganizing the content of courses and preparing casebooks,
often with conventional titles but with some substantial innovations in content. Our departed colieagues had stimulated us more, perhaps, than we
recognized.
It remains to be added that the Chicago Business School's descent
from the stars, though longer delayed than that of the Columbia faculty,
was no less inevitable. Until 1948-49, risk and risk-bearing persisted,
at least nominally, as a major functional specialty, with three component
courses: Theory of Risk and Risk-Bearing, Business Cycle Prediction
Gardner & Merrick, 46 H.Anv.L.REv. 1357 (1933), the last being a joint review by an
instructor who was using the book and a student in his class. It contains (p. 1358)
the following comment, not in derogation, but by way of emphasizing the advanced
treatment: "Indeed it seems that one may not unfairly ask the question whether
the 'sociological' and 'functional' approaches to law study are not inconsistent with
the educational principle of proceeding from the elementary to the complex." The
second edition was similarly received: see Dalzell, Book Review, 47 CoLUM.L.REv.
1087 (1947); Dunker, Book Review, 26 NEB.L.REv. 664 (1947); Goldberg, Book Review, 96 U.PA.L.REv. 601 (1948); and Gardner & Merrick, Book Review, 60 HMv.
L.REv. 1012 (1947), the last being a renewal of the collaboration mentioned above,
the former student being in practice in Chicago.
In 1927, Professor Patterson published his treatise on The Insurance Commissioner in the United States, the culmination of a study begun when he was a graduate student at Harvard. The last page (548) contains a delightful paragraph on the
problems of legal-sociological-economic research.
In this connection, mention should be made of the historic Report by the Committee to Study Compensation for Automobile Accidents (1932), made under the auspices
of Columbia University Council for Research in the Social Sciences. Among the
members of the committee were Professors Dowling and Chamberlain. See COLOm!wA UxirvinRsIy, REPORT OF THE DEANl,

SCHOOL OF LAW 7-8 (1932); Smith, Lilly,

and Dowling, Compensation for Automobile Accidents: A Symposium, 32 CoLDM.
L.REV. 785 (1932).
271 Letter dated March 28, 1955.
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and Control, and Insurance.2 72 In 1951-52, the course alignment was
altered, two courses in insurance being offered and one in investment.273
In 1952-53, the speciality was dropped, and a single elective course in
risk management was scheduled. 74 Since that time, both the course
and the terms "risk" and "risk-bearing" have disappeared from the curriculum of the school. The broad "functional' category of risk and tincertainty, based on an idea borrowed from pure economic theory, proved
unserviceable not only for law schools, but for the business schools as
well; but the law school discovered its limitations at the outset.
9. Miscellaneous matters. The group of courses dealing with procedural subjects presented a different problem from that presented by
the courses in substantive law. As we have seen, some procedural law
was caught up in the ultimate organization of courses on security and
on criminal law and its administration. Leaving these aside, there appears to have been no discussion of resort to nonlegal materials in the
procedure field, 75 and, therefore, any extended discussion of the deliberations on the organization of the curriculum in this respect would be beyond the scope of this paper. There were problems of organization of
this material, however, and because they tend to throw some light on the
issues raised by the reorganization effort in general, they must be briefly
noted.
The report of the committee 2 70 was in three main parts. Three possible plans of organization were discussed: (1) one based on the point
of view of the lawyer in practice; (2) one which would distribute the
materials among other courses, to relate them to the functions of substantive rules; and (3) one based on the social viewpoint, treating procedural matters as a means of effectuating the purpose of law to control
human behavior. The second was considered only to be rejected. 77
The tension was between the first, supported by a separate statement by
Professors Michael and Smith,2 7' and the third, advocated in a supple272 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO AOIotCEmmENiTs: THE SCHOOL OF Bus=nEss 25
(1948-49).
273 Id. at 23 (1951-52).
274 id. at 23 (1952-53).
275 Presumably, the effect of procedural rules might have been studied with a view
to comparing their actual effects with those assumed by "judicial empiricism," as It
was proposed to study substantive rules; but this possibility did not enter the discussions.
276 Document No. 43 (styled a "preliminary" report, but no other was filed).
277 "Disintegration of the material in the field of law administration is too great
a price to pay for its complete integration with that in other fields. . . . We
suppose that a husband's failure to support his wife may be regarded as a type-fact
situation in the field of the family and that a breach of a contract to sell may be so

regarded in the field of marketing. However, actions for maintenance and for
breach of contract are largely governed by the same rules of pleading, practice,
and procedure." Statement of Michael and Smith, id. at 341, 348.
278 Id. at 341.
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ment prepared by Professor Oliphant.2 9 For Oliphant, the logic underlying the reorganization of the substantive parts of the curriculum extended equally to the procedural parts. "Granted we know from a study
of substantive law how we want people to behave, what is the totality
of devices, whether direct or indirect, calculated to cause them so to
act?" 20 This kind of treatment would comprehend under law administration not only pleading, practice, procedure, and evidence, but also
administrative procedure, legislation, and the constitutional limitations
on legislative action."8' It would go even farther. Oliphant had come
to be impressed by the important role played in the control of social
behavior by indirect sanctions, such as taxation and the denial of civil
remedies. The emphasis he placed on such matters indicates that a large
part of the study of law administration, as he visualized it, would have
been concerned with them; and the range of that kind of study is indicated by his reference to the law on promises to perform pre-existing
legal duties as consideration, by way of showing how the denial of civil
remedies may affect behavior.as 2 Professors Michael and Smith, after
a sympathetic and cogent statement of the general objectives of curriculum revision, argued that the treatment of procedural matters from a
systematic standpoint was quite consistent with those objectives :283
Law administration is itself an activity and the legal material in the field
is already organized functionally, that is, in terms of the various subsidiary
activities which occur in the course of the major activity of executing, enIn both respects, in the organization
forcing, and applying the law. . .
of legal material and in terminology, the field of law administration differs
radically from those fields to which a functional approach may be made only
by translating legal concepts into their corresponding activities and by applying a new terminology.
A reorganization of the materials was desirable, but primarily in order
to focus attention on the purpose of the rules and so avoid the tendency
to concentrate on the rules themselves and on logically perfect systems
of rules.- 4 For purposes of the curriculum, these members of the committee proposed to exclude from the category legislation, administration
by nongovernmental agencies, and also administration by nonjudicial
agencies or devices.285 Their purpose was to integrate the various pro279 Id. at 350.
280 Id. at 352.
281 Id. at 352.

282 Id. at 353.
283 Id. at 344.
284 Id. at 345.
285 Id. at 342-43. In Classifying Oliphant's indirect sanctions under the head
of "The Automatic Administration of Law," also to be omitted from the course outline, they seem to have failed to meet his point squarely.
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cedure courses as much as possible, to present judicial and quasi-judicial
administration of law as a continuous process, to make that process more
vivid and realistic, and to bring out more clearly the relationship between
devices for law administration and the substantive law.2- The main
body of the report, prepared by Professor Magill,2 8 7 was an exercise in
diplomacy, designed to compose these divergent viewpoints-a feat which
was accomplished by omitting such matters as indirect sanctions from
the proposed course outline and relegating them to a schedule of matters
to be investigated by the faculty.m
In 1927-28, in cooperation with a research group at the Yale Law
School headed by Dean Hutchins, Professor Michael and Professor
Adler (of the Department of Psychology) participated in a study of the
logical and psychological foundations of the rules of evidence.2 89 This
activity resulted in the publication of a series of articles 20 which were
thus characterized by the principal author, Robert M. Hutchins, a few
years later: 291
-

.

-the

law of evidence is obviously full of assumptions about how

people behave. We understood that the psychologists knew how people behave. We hoped to discover whether an evidence case was "sound" by finding out whether the decision was in harmony with psychological doctrine.
What we actually discovered was that psychology had dealt with very few of
the points raised by the law of evidence; and that the basic psychological
problem of the law of evidence, what will affect juries, and in what way,
The committee on legislation never filed its report, perhaps because of the early
decision as to the disposition of that topic. In 1928-29, it was decided to Include
a course on legislation in the required curriculum of the first year. COLUMBIA
UNIVERSITY, REPORT OF THE DEAN, SCHOOL OF LAw 24 (1929).
286 Document No. 43, op. cit. supra note 276, at 349.
287 Who in the same year published his rather orthodox Cases on Civil Procedure
(1927).
288 Document No. 43, op. cit. supra note 276, at 336. A second edition of the
casebook cited in note 287 supra was published in 1932 and a third (with Professor
Chadbourn as co-editor), in 1939. Michael's Elements of Judicial Controversy and
Hays's Cases and Materials on Civil Procedure were published in 1948 and 1947,
respectively. These materials furnish no evidence that the Columbia curriculum
was directly influenced by the more radical thought on functionalism of the 1920's.
289 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, REPORT OF THE DEAI, SCHOOL OF LAW 21-22 (1928);
id. at 15-16 (1929) ; id. at 13 (1934) ; id. at 14 (1935) ; id. at 17 (1936).
290 Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence, 28 COLum.
L.REv. 432 (1928); Some Observations on the Law of Evidence-Memory, 41 HARv.
ILREv. 860 (1928) ; Some Observations on the Law of Evidence-The Competency of
Witnesses, 37 YALE L.J. 1017 (1928); Some Observations on the Law of Evidence
-State of Mind To Prove an Act, 38 YALE L.J. 283 (1929); Some Observations on
the Law of Evidence-Consciousness of Giilt, 77 U.PA.L.REv. 725 (1929); and
Some Observations on the Law of Evidence-State of Mind in Issue, 29 COLUM.L.
REv. 147 (1929). The series was said to represent the joint work of Hutchins, Slesinger, Michael, and Adler.
291 Hutchins, The Autobiography of an Ex-law Student, 1 U.CI.LL.R1EV. 511, 513
(1934). For Hutchins' earlier views, see Modern Movements in Legal Education:
A Symposium, 6 Am.L.ScHOOL REv. 402 (1929); The Law and the Psychologists, 16
YALE REv. 678 (1927).
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was one psychology had never touched at all. Thus psychologists could teach
you that the rule on spontaneous exclamations was based on false notions
about the truth-compelling qualities of a blow on the head. They could not
say that the evidence should be excluded for that reason. They did not know
enough about juries to tell you that; nor could they suggest any method of
finding out enough about juries to give you an answer to the question.
Hutchins concluded that the proper approach to the study of law was
through analysis of its basic concepts and principles, which are derived
from the rational sciences of ethics and politics. 9 2 Similar conclusions
were apparently reached by the Columbia participants; for the volume
which resulted from their activities in this direction 92 3 was a highly
formalized analysis which "could not have been developed without the
aid of symbolic notation." 294
Finally, the faculty gave attention to the construction of a general
introductory course 25 and to the study of historical and comparative
jurisprudence. 29 6 Jurisprudence was broadly conceived as comprehending not only legal philosophy, but ancient law, legal history, and comparative law. The committee, sensing a threat to such studies implicit
in the particularistic approach to curricular organization, made a bold
plea for an elaborate research organization and for attention in the
undergraduate curriculum to such matters as logic, Roman law, and the
history of the common law. It affirmed that the study of jurisprudence
could and should be "directed along functional or sociological lines, i.e.,
it should concern itself not with legal institutions as such but with legal
institutions in their social and economic milieu"; 29 and it suggested that
one of the major features of work in jurisprudence would be to correlate
work in the social sciences with the study of law. 98 Professor Oliphant's
summary reflected more of his own point of view than of the committee's enthusiasm: 299
Except for the training of teachers and research workers, and for the
student tool stuff which they yield, we are not primarily interested in historical, comparative and analytical jurisprudence for their own sakes.
.
We are primarily interested in these three phases of juristic study
* .
as means to other ends. Teleological jurisprudence stands upon another
292 Hutchins, The Autobiography of an Bo-law Student, 1 U.CHIL.REv. 511, 516-17
(1934). Of. MICHAEL & ADLER, Cnnr, LAw A) SOCIAL SCIENCE, supra note 190.
293 MIcy.AL & ADLER, TE NATUE OF JUDICIAL PROOF (1931) (privately printed).
2D4 Id. at v. See Michael & Adler, The Trial of an Issue of Fact: 1, 34 CoLt.r.
L.REv. 1224 (1934); I, id. at 1462 (1934), where the authors set forth their analysis

and vigorously maintain that there is no incompatibility between the realist and
the idealist approaches to law.
295 Documents 21, 22, and 65; SummARY

oF STUDIES

61.

296 Document No. 32.

297 Id. at 156.
298 Id. at 162.
299 SUMMARY OF STUDIES 165.
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footing however. One of our definite and most important objectives is to
enable a student to see that rules of law need to be judged from the standpoint of their practical utility, while seeing, at the same time, the temptations
to make over-hasty judgments of this sort.
But as the curriculum developed, it followed very much the lines set out
300
in the committee's report.
IV
Any attempt, at this stage, to pass final judgment on the functionalsociological approach to legal education would be premature.30 ' On the
basis of this examination of the innovations considered at Columbia
in the most intense phase of the movement, however, some tentative and
limited observations may be made. Two things are clear: first, the
events of the late Twenties were the stimulus to a remarkable productivity, imaginativeiess, and vitality in legal education; and second, the
goals of the moie ambitious planners were far from realized. We are
interested in the reasons for the successes, and (since there is no disguising the pathological aspects of this study) perhaps even more interested in the reasons .for the failures. Some of the observations which
seem appropriate at this stage may conveniently be permitted to emerge as
we trace the course of development of the official attitude over the immediately succeeding years.
It was in the spring of 1927, in the deanship of Huger W. Jervey, that
the faculty did its most intensive work on revision of the curriculum.
Because of Dean Jervey's illness, there were no reports of the dean in
the years 1926 and 1927. Accordingly, Dean Smith, in his report for
1928, set forth a full account of the faculty studies and the events leading to them. The account was a sympathetic exposition of the dominant
objectives, and, in general, the tone was one of quiet pride in what had
been accomplished and of confidence that further progress was forthcoming. Nevertheless, even this early, troublespors were visible. Plainly
evident was the fear that the result of the radical revision of the curiculum, and even the purpose of some of its more ardent supporters,
might be to impair the professional training afforded by the school and
turn Columbia into a mere research institute for the "scientific" study
of law as an aspect of social organization. There were grounds for
such a fear. While some members of the faculty adhered to the view
that the major objective should remain that of providing an adequate

Zoo A course on the development of legal Institutions was first offered by Professor Goebel in 1928-29. COLUmBiA UN=ERsriY, REPORT OF THE DEAN, Scioor
or LAw 16 (1928). His Development of Legal Institutions was published in 1931, and
Its seventh revision, In 1946.
301 The plan of this study calls for examination of the underlying legal philosophy
and of later educational developments, at Columbia and elsewhere, before concluaions are attempted. See Part 1, 3 J.LEGAL EDUc. 331'(1951).
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scientific 'preparation for public service ih law, others asserted that it
should be to build a "community of scholars" for the study of. law as an
aspect of social organization. Moreover, the latter held that no single
university could effectively pursue both objectives. 302 Dean Smith discussed fully the merits of the two views on objectives and stated firmly
that, in the opinion of the faculty, it was both feasible and desirable for
the School to pursue both:

303

Whatever may be said in favor of establishing elsewhere a school or institute devotefi exclusively to research in law, the present important position
now occupied by Columbia Law School in the field of legal education, coupled
with the fact that it is outstanding as a first-grade professional school in the
state of New York, makes it socially desirable that it should not relinquish its
hold upon prospective members of the Bar. At the same time, it is also desirable to build up at Columbia a community of scholars who, unhampered
by teaching responsibilities, may devote their time to the study of law as an
aspect of social organization.
Few things ould have been more calculated to hamper acceptance of the
basic educational policy, at Columbia and elsewhere, than such a conflict.
The movement was not confronted merely with uninformed opposition
on the part of people who misinterpreted its objectives; some of its
most ardent supporters were expressly proclaiming its nonprofessional
purpose. Among those who recalled how narrowly the professional
character of ithe school under Dwight had escaped dissipation (supposedly) at the hands of Lieber and Burgess, 304 consternation must have
been substantial. Yet any suggestion that the professional purpose of
the school should be abandoned or made secondary was a needless and
reckless deviation from the basic theme. No such suggestion was even
remotely in the mind of Dean Stone; the changes he proposed were designed to strengthen and improve education for the practice of law.
Dean Smith, in reporting the faculty's rejection of the suggestion, might
302 See COLUMBIA UMVERSITY, REPORT OF THE DEAN, SCHOOL OF LAW 18-19
(1928). In Document No. 3, unnamed members of the faculty were reported as
holding that "The time has arrived for at least one school to become a 'community
of scholars,' devoting itself 'primarily to the nonprofessional study of law, in order
that the function of law may be comprehended, its-results evaluated, and its development kept more nearly in step with the complex developments of modern life.'"
Id. at 9. The contention was taken seriously: "What are our objectives to be?
Are we to accept the objective of establishing a community of scholars for the
study of law? If so, must we accept it as our sole objective, if we wish the work
to be effectively done?" Id. at 22. See also Documents 10, 11, 22, 56, 61 (by Professor Oliphant, incorporating at p. 524, Walter Wheeler Cook's Scientifte Method
and the Law, published in 13 A.B.A.J. 303 (1927)), 62, and 63. In the summary, the
competing views were set out fully (SUMMAY oF STUDIES 18), with the statement
that the faculty had not formally adopted one to the exclusion of the other; but the
general attitude was said to be reflected in the conclusion that Columbia should
1
.
pursue both objectives concurrently. Id. at 22-24.
303 CoL MBIA UNERSITY, REPORT OF THE DEAi, SCHOOL or LAw 20 (1928).
304 See Part II, 3 J.LEGA EDUC. 331, 380-81.
8 Journal of Legal Ed.No.1-5
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have made clearer than he did the fact that the changes in the undergraduate curriculum were calculated to strengthen rather than to undermine professional training.
In the same year, two supporters of the basic educational philosophyProfessors Yntema and Douglas-resigned from the faculty; and Professor Kidd returned to the University of California." ° ' Problems of
finance came to the fore: the new program would require substantial
additions to the library's collection and staff, and manpower was needed
for research.

3

0

In 1929, Dean Smith again discussed fully the plan of reorganization,
this time taking care to emphasize the objective of improving training
for law practice. 7 Problems of personnel and of cost were again pressing. Referring to the research program, Dean Smith said: "The chief
obstacles to be overcome in making such work effective are the finding
of men who are willing and competent to undertake the work and the
securing of funds sufficient to finance it." 31

In this year, two of the

principal architects of the reorganization, Professors Moore and Oliphant, resigned from the faculty, prompting the observation: "To the
extent that the men who have left have aided in building up the faculties
of other institutions, the cause of legal education has been served; but
it is highly desirable, in the interests of legal education as well as in the
interests of the School, that those members of the present Faculty who
are familiar with the history of the various changes which have occurred
and who are the key men in the developments whch are now taking place
should be held together during the next decade." 309
305 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY. REPORT OrF THE DEAN, SCHOOL OF LAW 28-29 (1928).
Yntema left to join the "originating faculty" of the Johns Hopkins Institute for the
Study of Law, whose purposes were announced as the study of the economic and
social effects of law; the clarification and simplification of law; the training of
jurists and codifiers; and the guidance of writers of textbooks and thinkers upon the human effects of law. Other members of the "originating faculty" were
Walter Wheeler Cook, of Yale; Herman Oliphant, of Columbia (see note 309 inIra); and Leon C. Marshall, of Chicago. Editorial, "The Human iffects of Law",
14 A.B.A.J. 530 (1928). "It is not without significance that when the Institute of
Law was established by The Johns Hopkins University each of the four men selected to plan and start the institute had at one time been a member of the Columbia
Faculty." COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, REPORT OF THE DEAN, SCHOOL OF LAW 28 (1929).
See also The Johns Hopkim Institute for the Study of Law, 6 Am.L.ScHooL REV.
336 (1928).
306 COLUMBIA U nEsI,
REPOxRT or Tr DEAN, SCHOOL OF LANW 25 (1928).
307 "That these changes do not operate to lessen the student's knowledge of what
may be termed strictly professional matters is evidenced by the unusually large
proportion of the class graduating in June, 1929, who passed the New York bar examination with high scores. I mention this fact not because I regard the results of
bar examinations as a proper criterion for measuring the educational value of the
kind of training which is being given, but solely for the purpose of dispelling the
possible idea that such tra" ing will, in its effect, impair the student's knowledge
of rules of law." Id. at I8 (1929).
308 Id. at 9.
309 Id. at 29. Professor Oliphant was on sabbatical leave during the spring session of 1928-29. Id. at 29 (1928).
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In 1930, a new tone dominated the report--one of disillusionment and
even annoyance. After recapitulating his earlier accounts of the faculty's
experiments, Dean Smith said: 310
The results which had been obtained in 1929 were most encouraging, and
equally gratifying are the achievements during the year just ended, but the
consummation of our undertaking will depend largely upon the extent to
which the Faculty continues to be capable of that self-criticism which is essential to the proper development of an educational program. The only danger in the Columbia experiment is the danger of a premature conviction regarding the desirability of objectives or the effectiveness of particular methods
of attaining them.

.

.

If we are to accomplish the aims which have

inspired the developments which are taking place, the hypotheses upon which
we are proceeding must be constantly tested against actual results. There
must be the same zeal to recognize and admit error as there is to proclaim
success. A new hypothesis is usually assumed to be better than the one which
it supplants, but its truth is not established by turning it into a dogma.

No academician will fail to identify this as smoke betraying the fire of
personal conflict below the horizon. It is no secret that there was such
conflict. How could it be otherwise, given the strong personalities and
the strong convictions involved? There is, of course, no record of the
details, and that is just as well, since to explore them would serve no useful purpose. Any faculty that undertakes a major revision of its curriculum and its educational policy may expect personality conflicts, and it
cannot hope to solve them by resort to precedent.
The sheer magnitude of the task had become oppressive :311
It is easy to draw an indictment of the law and the administration of justice. It is simple to point out defects and indicate changes which promise
much. It requires no great ingenuity to assail legal doctrine or legal methodology or legal education and expose fallacies and ineffectiveness. It is
not difficult to rationalize the propositions that improvement is more likely
if there is a closer integration of law and economics, law and history, law
and government, law and philosophy, law and logic, law and psychology, law
and engineering, and that the university law school should aid in effectuating
the integration, but it is no easy task to bring these things to pass.
The contribution of the social sciences had proved disappointing:

V

310 Id. at 4-5 (1930).
3n Id. at 5. Cf. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATEmuALs or THE LAW OF SALES

ix (1930): "I have lifted my own voice to the lone moon, more than once. Yet it is a
far cry from desire to fulfillment. . . . [Tiheories take on a different aspect
when they are matched against a concrete effort to apply them."
312 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, REPOtT OF THE DEAN, SCHOOL OF LAW 5-6 (1930).
Michael and Adler's report on crime and criminology, supra note 190, had been
written at the time of this report. Id. at 10.
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[W]hile the pooling of knowledge derived from related fields
is prima facie a sound working hypothesis, this does not mean that the members of the Faculty are so naive as to: think that the other social sciences are
superior to legal science either in experience, in knowledge, or in method.
Indeed, it has not been an. uncommon experience for the dissatisfied legal
scholar, who has made excursions into the realm of economics, or of philosophy, or of psychology,' to return with a feeling of relief to the more
settled and orderly domain of the law .
..
Access to such assistance as the social sciences might be able to offer
was impeded by formidable barriers: 313
At the outset, we called in the economist, the philosopher, and the psychologist, to assist. They were helpful, they were stimulating, they gave us
ideas, they aided greatly in formulating a plan. But the economist, the
philosopher, or the psychologist, who knows little or nothing about law, is
as helpless as the lawyer, who knows little or nothing about economics or
philosophy or psychology, to bring about an integration of any real value.
These scholars have worked in isolation so long that they have developed
dissimilar disciplines, dissimilar techniques, and dissimilar languages. Methods valuable for one purpose may be useless for another. Data highly significant for one purpose may be meaningless for another. Moreover, due to
a difference in terminology or the meaning of concepts, it is exceedingly
difficult for a specialist in one field to interpret correctly the data in another.
The progress which has been made is due to the fact that some economist
or some philosopher acquired a working knowledge of law, or some member
of the Law Faculty acquired a working knowledge of one of the other social
sciences. Only in this way has it been possible to make effective use of nonlegal materials in the study of law.
Finally, much of the research undertaken had produced findings without significant value: 31
a considerable amount of fruitless research is inevitable in the
quest for new knowledge that has value. I believe, however, that much of
the waste incident to research in the social sciences could be avoided if more
attention were paid to the methods proposed for conducting particular
projects. . . . Too often does it appear that the results of research
in the social sciences are findings which represent nothing more than the
opinions of the investigators.
In 1931, Dean Smith returned with renewed confidence to the theme
that legal education should be improved by broad training in the social
sciences. His emphasis was on the effects of specialization in knowledge
and in labor, and on the need for coordination of specialized fields of
knowledge. The engineer had served to some extent as a coordinator
313 Id. at 0-7.
314 Id. at 9.
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in the fields of physical science; the lawyer, formerly the- foremost coordinator in the field of social science, had been transformed by increasing specialization "from a social philosopher into a legal technician." 315
The task of the law school was now conceived as that of developing a coordinating agent in the fields of law and government-a task to be accomplished only by improving the law student's "knowledge of the social sciences as a whole." s3s

Of course, no sane person would contend, in this day, that it is possible
for any one man to examine critically all the content of, the existing bodies
of knowledge even in the domain of the social sciences. But it is possible
for an individual to become sufficiently familiar with the related parts of the
different fields to give him perspective and understanding of the problems
created by the needs and the activities of interdependent social groups; at
least he would be aware of the existence of the various bodies of knowledge
and would know how to draw upon them as occasion required. 317
In 1932, Dean Smith spoke only briefly of the integration program.
Setting it against the history of legal education, he: seemed to suggest
that the new outlook was common to good, modem, full-time law schools,
although he also seemed to suggest that it was manifested op~in~ipally
in the research activity of faculty members; and he was careful to add
that the study of legal history and the analysis of legal concepts had
not been abandoned. 1
In 1933, he was able to point to developments
under the New Deal as demonstrating "the interdependence of law and
of government, and the importance of relating more closely the study
of law and of its application, to the study of those social, economic and
political ends but for which there would be no rational basis for the existence of law." 319 It was in this year that he reported the establishment
of a board of visitors:

30

In view of the important changes that have occurred in legal thought and
in legal education during the last decade, particularly those developments
with which Columbia Law School has been conspicuously identified, it wasproposed last spring by the Standing Committee of the Alumni Association
of the School of Law that a Board of Visitors, consisting of representative
alumni and other members of the bench and bar, should be selected from year
315 Id. at
316 Ibid.

7 (1931).

3'17 Id. at 9.
Dean Smith also argued that emphasis on the function of law in
society was the surest way of inculcating a sense of professional responsibility. Id.

at 13.

at 5 (1932).
at 3 (1933). Calls upon members of the faculty to perform governmental
service in this period diverted a substantial amount of energy from research and
course-building. Professors Berle, Dowling, Handler, Hanna, Deak, and Magill were
all doing governmental work. Id. at 7.
320[d. at 7-8.
318 Id.
319 Id.
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to year to visit the School, to study and appraise its work, to report on its
condition and needs, and to make recommendations to the Faculty and to
the Trustees of the University.
Clearly, the doubts which had been raised (with what justification we
have seen) concerning the quality of professional education at Columbia
had not been allayed, and the alumni mounted guard.32 '
In 1934, for the first time, the Dean's Report contained no discussion
of the program of curriculum revision; it was devoted to other problems
of legal education. There was reference to research work in progress,
but the only relevant development in the curriculum was the inaugura32
tion of Professor Hale's course on Legal Factors in Economic Society.
By 1935, a new theme of curriculum revision was engaging the faculty's
attention: increased emphasis on public law and on the public implications of private law.32 3 In 1936, the absorbing problem was overcrowding of the bar. Finally, in 1937, in his tenth annual report, Dean Smith
summed up the developments of the decade. Of Oliphant's Summary
of Studies he said: "
[It] presented the most pervasive analysis and challenging discussion of legal education that had been put forth up to that time. While
many of the proposals contained in that document have since been modified
or rejected by the Columbia Faculty, it nevertheless served as a basis for
experimentation during succeeding years by our own Faculty and it stimulated similar inquiries and activities in other schools.
On the extent to which the curriculum had been functionally organized
and on the incorporation of nonlegal materials, he did not dwell; but he
could point to the fact that, of the forty courses offered in the school,
thirty-six were taught with collections of materials prepared by members
of the Columbia faculty within the past ten years-twenty-six of them
in the form of published casebooks, many of which had been widely
adopted by other schools.32 5 In the same period, members of the faculty
had published twenty-eight treatises and 356 articles in legal periodicals
and other scientific journals. 2 6 Not all of this product, by any means,
represented progress in the integration of law and the social sciences;
but much of it was stimulated by the climate engendered by the faculty's
determined attack on that problem. A concrete idea of the cost of the
program was afforded by the fact that some $440,000 in grants had been
321 Subsequent reports regularly mention the meetings of the Board of Visitors,
and it is recorded that on occasion reports were read and discussed; but there Is
no indication of their content.
322 Id. at 10 (1934).
323 Id. at 4 (1935).
324 Id. at 4 (1937).
3251. at 5-6.
326 Ia. at 8-9.
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obtained during the ten-year period for research on law as a social institution and for the compilation of integrated teaching materials. 2 7
Dean Smith's general conclusion was: 3S
The accomplishments are not all that one might desire, but they are, in
many respects, extraordinary. As a whole they are impressive. Certainly
they represent a contribution to legal education the significance of which is
only beginning to be appreciated. The ultimate effects cannot be fully appraised for some years to come.
Nor can they yet be fully appraised; but certain observations in addition
to those suggested by Dean Smith's reports may be ventured.
To begin with, it seems clearly unfortunate that the new movement
was so ambitious and so highly organized, and that it took the form of an
attempt to reorganize and revamp the entire curriculum. Such an attempt would have encountered major difficulties in a far less complex
situation. Imagine what would have happened if the Harvard faculty
in the 1870's, inspired by the success of Langdell's experiments with the
case method, had by a majority vote adopted a resolution calling for the
adoption of that method forthwith throughout the curriculum. The
most enthusiastic supporters of such a resolution would have discovered
soon enough that the construction of a casebook is no overnight matter;
they would have learned, too, as we have learned since, that not every
topic is best treated by the case method. Among the majority would have
been teachers who supported the resolution not because they were deeply
convinced of the soundness of the method, or even understood it fully,
but because they were influenced by the leaders and because they sensed
in it the way of the future; these would have had special difficulty in
making the adjustment. In the minority would have been men like
Washburn, who, "while never showing the least opposition or resentment

.

.

.

felt that he was too old to come into complete sym-

pathy with all these novelties." 329 What the effect would have been on
Thayer, who adopted the case method only in his own good time,330 no
one can tell; he might have been alienated entirely. The verdict of
history is that the Washburns were wrong; but even if that had been
clear at that time, who will say that the light should have been thrust
upon them? Certainly Langdell did not. He was "firm in his own belief, so firm that he left the system to prove its own value, utterly without aid of argument. As has been well said, 'one of the most striking
facts in the life of Professor Langdell is the deep silence which surrounds
his work. He accomplished a revolution without getting into a contro327 Id. at 8.
328 Id. at 5.
329 2 CHARLES WARREN, HISTORY OF THE HArvARD LAW SCHOOL 401 (1908).

330 Id. at 449.
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versy. * As Professor Ames has pointed out, he never wrote anything in
explanation or defense of his system after the brief statement made in
the preface to his collection of Cases on Contracts.' The bitter criticism
directed at his methods by law reviews and Law Professors was never
answered by Langdell. He allowed his system absolutely to speak for
itself." 331

The Columbia faculty adopted no such resolution, of course, and no
pledges of conformity were exacted of its members. But the fierce
evangelism of the leaders and the corporate character of the campaign to remake the curriculum according to a master plan produced
difficulties of much the same sort. The intellectual differences between
Oliphant and Michael, certainly, were such that a man of Michael's integrity could make no use of Oliphant's brilliant conceptions until, in
his own way and in his own time, he found place for them in his thinking. Meanwhile, he must speak his mind. In addition, the Columbia reorganization involved problems far beyond those of the transition to the
case, method: Langdell could apply his method to existing courses in
contracts, equity, and sales; 33 but a radical reclassification of the subject matter of law was thought to be basic to the Columbia program.
The selection, classification, and arrangement of the cases "which had
contributed in any important degree to the growth, development, or establishment of any of its essential doctrines" 333 was a formidable task, but at
least the cases were there, in the reports. The materials sought by the
Columbia faculty were relatively inaccessible, written in different technical languages, and in some instances nonexistent. Moreover, all this
was undertaken precipitantly, as witness Professor Powell's sense of
"immediate and appalling urgency" 331 and the scheduling of a reorganized course in criminal law before an outline or a plan of even experi3
mental treatment was in existence.

35

The only justification for this concerted and urgent attack on the
problem-the ideal of simplifying the curriculum and avoiding duplication-turned out to be an illusion. Some areas of the law could be
331 Id.
332 As

at 393.
it happened, however, Harvard did invent a new course, with reactions similar to those encountered at Columbia: "We are inclined to think that Torts Is not a
proper subject for a law book," said the American Law Review (as quoted by Warren, op. cit. supra note 329, at 376). "Under this title we expect to find some or all
of the wrongs remedied by the action of trespass, trespass on the case and trover.
But we cannot help believing that the cohesion or legal relationship, say of trespass
quare clausum, is closer with the duties to him in possession enforced by real actions than with assault and battery. . . . Seduction, which we find in the next
chapter of this book, belongs at the other end of the corpus juri3s." Escape from the
tyranny of classifications is never a new problem, and never an easy one.
333 Introduction to 0. C. LANGDELL, CASES ON COa CTs vii (1871).
334 Supra note 168.
335 Supra note 185.
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functionally organized with spectacular success; others were not -susceptible at all of functional treatment; and any thorough-going functional organization would have threatened duplication on a scale far
beyond anything suggested by the superimposition of a few special
courses on the traditional curriculum. One reason for this was that
"functional" did not have, and perhaps could not have, a fixed meaning.
Sometimes it had an institutional connotation, as in the case of the
family; but the course on security was functional in a different sense,
and "wealth distribution" in still another, and "risk and risk-bearing"
was so in a sense different from any of these. Nor did successftil functional classifications often result, as they were expected to, in the saving
of time sufficient to accommodate the new material in the curriculum.
On the contrary, like so much of the fruitful work that is done, the successful efforts tended to expose the overgeneralization of law and the
need for more detailed, discriminating, and selective treatment. 336 The
functional concept of the business organization did not fuse Agency and
Partnership with Corporations; it did threaten to make Corporations
into three separate courses. When compression was achieved, as in the
course on future interests and trusts, it was the product of legal scholarship which, while it was stimulated by the functional approach, was by
no means dependent on it. Some of this had been foreseen from the beginning; 3 1 when the truth became increasingly evident, and the prospect of even ultimate simplification seemed increasingly remote, the faculty was undismayed. As Professor Powell had pointed out, new knowledge is to be welcomed and not shunned because it may complicate the
problems of teaching. 338 When Enrico Fermi withdrew the cadmium
rod from the pile at Stagg Field he was doubtless concerned about many
things, but not, I imagine, about the effect of the experiment on the curriculum of the Department of Physics. Professor Powell's attitude was
the only one possible; but as the evidence mounted against the theory
that the key to simplification had been found, it was equally clear that
there was no longer any reason for proceeding under forced draft nor
for the inverted procedure of defining courses first and searching for
content later. The rather abrupt moderation of the movement which
had started so pretentiously probably brought relief to conservative law
336 Of. Llewellyn, Introduction to JEROME HALL, Tn r, LAw AN SociETY (1935).
337". . . [W]e shall not at the outset be able to cut from, as well as we shall
be able to add to the curriculum. After five or ten years' boiling, we may have
worked out a wholly new curriculum of something like present size. But two years
hence we shall have added more than we have cut. Partly, because that is how
men's minds work. Partly, because much now taught is really vital. Partly because
Llewellyn,
progressive reorganization almost certainly involves overlapping."
Dreams in Response to ProfessorMarshaZUs Questions, in MEMORANDA OF THE MARSmHAL CONERENCES 3a, 3g (1929).

338 Supra note 124.
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teachers; but the abandonment, when its justification failed, of a plan of
action which had at best been questionable was neither failure nor surrender.
A related difficulty was the excessive emphasis on business as the
dominant concern and justification of law. This was attributable not
to any hypothetical orientation of the Columbia Law School toward
Wall Street, but to the undoubted orientation of Marshall and Oliphant
toward the University of Chicago School of Business. It showed itself
in the Summary of Studies, where seven chapters were devoted to the
main components of the curriculum, five of which were devoted to business categories: Marketing, Business Associations, Finance and Credit,
Labor Relations, and Risk and Risk Bearing. The sixth dismissed
such matters as jurisprudence, legal history, and comparative law with
the remark that they were important only in so far as they contributed
to the teleological criticism of law-largely in terms, it must be presumed, of commercial and economic ends. In the seventh, Professor
Oliphant gathered together, under the ampersand heading, "Communal
Standards and Political Relations," some odds and ends not otherwise'
provided for, such as the family, crime, real property, public law, and
taxation.3 39 It showed itself most plainly in the proposal to treat the
law of torts almost entirely from the standpoint of the risks of business
enterprise. This was understandable, given the prevailing enthusiasm
for the business-school curriculum as the model of functional elegance;
but even in Wall Street, law is concerned not only with business, but
with ordinary human relations and-as the faculty was reminded by
the advent of the New Deal-with government and politics.
The greatest of the manifold difficulties associated with the assimilation of nonlegal materials seems to me to have been the lack of any sharp
conception of the purpose to be served by such materials and, more particularly, the frustrations and defections which resulted when the more
ambitious conceptions of the goal were disappointed. Sometimes the
felt need was simply for a descriptive account of the business background
against which legal doctrine operated; sometimes it was for a detailed
account of the behavior of business executives or housewives; sometimes
it was for the accumulation in one place of all knowledge concerning
an institution, such as the family, so that all possible interactions could
be observed and appreciated; and, too often, it was for ultimate verity
;concerning such problems as the causes of crime and the efficacy of law
as a corrective. The tendency to ask the wrong questions of other
339 Law administration, embracing most of procedure, was referred to only Incidentally in another chapter.

SUMMARY OF STUDIES 74. But compare the chart at

p. 64, which suggests a more balanced distribution of emphasis.
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disciplines and to expect too much of the replies is persistent. When the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia last year made its historymaking appeal to medicine and psychiatry, it was seeking light on the
true nature of insanity or the true criteria for determining criminal
responsibility. 340 When it announced, with considerable flourish, that
the century-old M'Naghten test was fallacious and inadequate and that
a new test, in harmony with the findings of modem medicine, was to be
erected in its place, the triumph of science over medievalism was greeted
with much rejoicing. No one, however, could be very sure that the results of criminal trials would be materially affected by the change nor,
if they were, whether the change would be a welcome one.34 ' Perhaps
we would be on sounder ground if it had been possible for the court to
refer to a body of literature which would have revealed something about
how the old rule had worked in practice; how many defendants were
acquitted and how many convicted on pleas of insanity; what the record
showed as to mental condition in each case; and what the history of the
defendants was after their release, imprisonment, or commitment. We
might likewise feel more confident if we could expect such studies to
be made of experience under the new rule. The collection of such information would be laborious and expensive; the results might be
neither complete nor conclusive; and the project would not further significantly the quest for the ultimate answer to that fascinating and somewhat mystical question concerning the true nature of insanity, or the
true test of criminal responsibility. Nevertheless, when the issue 'is,
whether to discard the old rule and substitute a new one, the experince
under the old and the probable experience under the new seem more relevant than any other considerations. Similarly, when Prbfessor Fuller discusses the relationship between psychology and the rules relating to frustration and impossibility of performance, he neglects, it seems to me,
one of the more productive insights developed in the course of the Co-'
lumbia studies, namely, the characterization of such rules as devices for
the apportionment of risk.34
The frustrations and defections stemming from the failure of the
social sciences to yield promptly the solutions which were desired created
an impression far out of proportion to their importance. Indeed, it is
not easy to determine whether the most influential defection was due
to a philosophical rejection of the empirical method, to financial obstacles,
or simply to faulty logic. When Robert Hutchins, in 1933, spoke of his
Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.O.Cir.11954).
See generally the symposium, Insanity and the Criminal Law--A (ritiqlie
of Durham v. United States, 22 U.CHi.L.R v. 317 (1955), especially Wechsler, The
Criteriaof CriminalResponsibility, id. at 367.
342 L. L. luii=R, BASIC CO-aTRACT LAW 666 (1947). Cf. Patterson, The Apportioument of Business Risks through Legal Devices, 24 COLu.L.REV. 335 (1924).
340
341
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researches of 1928 and 1929 as of a youthful indiscretion, his reasoning
was:
1. Psychology can'tell us that certain rules of evidence are predicated
on assumptions which are demonstrably fallacious;
2. But psychology cannot tell us whether the rules should be changed,
because that depends on how the jury evaluates the evidence in question,
and neither the psychologist nor anyone else has studied the jury;
3. Therefore, we should abandon experimental and interdisciplinary
efforts, and return to an attempt to construct a systematic science of
law on the principles of ethics and politics.
As a logician, Hutchins must have known-a non sequitur when he
saw one. When he made the statements paraphrased above, he was
president of the University of Chicago. It seems peculiarly appropriate
that it is the Law School of that University which has taken up the
thread of his reasoning at the point where it broke, and which is conducting an experimental and interdisciplinary study of the jury. But
then, 1933 was a year of deep depression, and the Ford Foundation had.
not yet been established.
The prospects for further progress in the interrelation of law and the
social *sciences, so far as the law school curriculum is concerned, rest
34 3
primarily, but not exclusively, on the enterprise of individual teachers. '
It.is no longer necessary, if it ever was, to classify the curriculum functionally in-orde to'call attention to the relevance of knowledge developed
in other disciplines or to remind us that law is a means to an end. The,
individual" tbacher, preparing the materials for whatever course may
be assigned to him, Will seek insights and syntheses where he can find
them. 'He will frequently question the validity of his assumptions; he
will1e. cuious 'about business practices, about family customs, about
tesameitiy dispositiohas, and about the effects and the justification
of legdl-'rules. 'Siice he will not often be able to. obtain or evaluatethe information he needs without the aid of experts in other fields,
th
,ise
mtlsthbe, adeqtate research failities at his disposal. If he is.
.343 "Flirther ,substantial progress in the integration of law and social science for
th4 liiiridoses of, legal education will not result from the efforts of essayists, nor even
from the 'delibifations of curriculum committees, but from the painstaking and'
particularized Offorts of those who organize our course materials." Part I, 3 J.,
LEGAL EDIuc. 33i, 340 (1951). "Many of our Benthamic expectations for social engineering through' law have been millenarian. As in any area of living, great expectations are bound to create moods of frustration or disillusion, of tired admisslon.
that the tried and tested ways are best after all. What has been wanting has been
someone who wofild tackle the job of social science integration, not in fitful law
review articlesor books, but in methodical and tangible material to be used in teaching in a particular field." Riesman, Law and ,Social Science: A Report on Michael
and Wechsle'a Classbookc on Criminal Law and Administration, 50 YALE L.J. 036,
(1941).
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thus able to compile a set of materials which significantly brings nonlegal learning to bear on some classification of the problems with
which law deals, room will be found for his course in the curriculum,
and his book will sell. If he does not do so, someone else will.
Oliphant compiled a pioneering casebook which required the addition to the curriculum of a new course, based on a novel grouping of
materials; the novel course is now standard in almost every, law schoo!i
If he had devoted his energies to the improvement of that book and to
the construction of others, instead of to building fires in the camps of
his colleagues, he might have been remembered, like Langdell, as the
founder of a new era in legal education rather than as the leader of a
movement which foundered. 34" Langdell did not originate the idea of
the case method; "' he compiled the first successful casebooks. Since
that is what counts, he deserves every bit of the recognition he has received as the true inventor; but it is instructive to state the achievement
accurately.
Not only must research facilities be available to individual teachers
to be used as the need arises, but there must, of course, be organized
and systematic research in law and the social sciences directed toward
the discovery of new knowledge without reference to the law school
curriculum. The product will inevitably be reflected in the training of
undergraduate law students, as it is incorporated by the compilers of
teaching materials; but there is no more reason for harnessing research
of this kind to the curriculum than there is for similarly conditioning
research in the physical sciences. So long as the product of such research is not known, it is hard to see how anyone can, with confidence,
look forward to a time when it will make possible a new synthesis and
permit the construction of a neat and comprehensive three-year law curriculum, unembarrassed by the problem of elective courses. It is much
344 During his entire career at Columbia following the publication of his casebook, Oliphant published nothing which directly furthered the objects of the reorganization plan. He wrote a great deal in advocacy of the movement (not all of
which was good public relations: his plea for a Return to Stare Decisis (Ass'N
OOLS, HANDB00K 61 (1927)) was transparently disingenuous); but his
oF Am. L.
technical product consisted of just two articles on the law of contracts, in which
his approach was based on logic, on the analysis of precedents, and on strictly
"arm-chair" evaluation of the practical considerations. Oliphant, Mutuality of Obligation in Bilateral Contracts at Law, 25 COLu.L.REV. 705 (1925); id., 28 Cor.u.
L.REV. 997 (1928).
345 "At New York University Law School between 1865-1867 young Elihu Root
studied law under John Norton Pomeroy. The course consisted in reading assigned
cases and participating in discussion of them in a small class under the lead of
Pomeroy's questions. Pomeroy's approach was radically different from the prevailing text-and-lecture method. But it did not fall to him to shape . . . the
course of law training in the United States." WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF
AmERicAN LAW: THE LAW MAiMRs 261 (1950). See also ALFRED Z. REED, TRAINING FOR Tim Pumo PRoF-EssoN OF THE LAw 371-72 (1921).
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more likely that new insights, new knowledge, and new relationships
will make the task of the law teacher increasingly complex and call upon
him to employ all his ingenuity and all the resources of educational experience in building a program of undergraduate training. It may be
that the profession which once learned to place method above subject
matter will have to learn to do so again. At all events, there is no
necessity to revise the curriculum in anticipation of the fruits of research to come.
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